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Wednesday, July 07, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Four Court of Appeals Opinions Today

Larriante Sumbry v. Miscellaneous Dockets for the Year 2003 (7/7/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]

Here the Court affirms the trial court's rejection of Sumbry's attempt to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. "Sumbry argues all manner of due process violations based on the trial court’s refusal to conduct a hearing on his petition. However, the fact of the matter is that, as the trial court notes in its Order, Sumbry simply fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. * * * Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Sumbry’s attempt to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." In a footnote, the Court points to the fact that "The Indiana Legislature has recently passed a bill that provides for the screening of inmate lawsuits. HB 1153, which will be codified at Indiana Code chapter 34-58-1 and will become effective July 1, 2004" and then quotes it in full. Chapter 2 of the new law deals with "abusive litigation."

Jerome L. Williams v. State of Indiana (7/7/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
MATHIAS, Judge

Jerome Williams (“Williams”) pled guilty to felony murder in Bartholomew Superior Court and was sentenced to serve sixty years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Williams appeals his sentence and argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found his race to be an aggravating circumstance. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it found Williams’ race to be an aggravating circumstance, we reverse and remand for resentencing. * * *

[W]e are very uncomfortable with the trial judge’s reference to the fact that Williams is African-American and the victim is white as an aggravating circumstance. While the trial judge’s concern over race relations in the community is laudable, his use of Williams’ race to address that concern during the sentencing proceedings was impermissible. * * *

These statements indicate that the trial court relied heavily on the victim’s age and her selection as Williams’ victim because of her age when it enhanced Williams’ sentence by five years. However, given the lengthy discussion of Williams’ race during the sentencing proceedings, we cannot conclude that the invalid aggravating circumstance played an unimportant role in the trial court’s decision to aggravate Williams’ sentence. Because we are unable to say with confidence that the trial court’s consideration of the permissible aggravating circumstances would have led to the same result, we reverse and remand this case for resentencing
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
BARNES, J., and CRONE, J., concur.

Donna J. MacLafferty v. William P. MacLafferty (7/7/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]

"The trial court did not err when it reduced Father’s child support obligation because Mother’s increase in income constitutes a changed circumstance so substantial and continuing as to make the terms of the April 17, 2002 child support order unreasonable. Also, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the children’s summer day camp was no longer a necessary child care expense. Finally, the trial court’s modification of Father’s midweek parenting time was in the children’s best interests. Affirmed."

William Lee Roberts Jr. v. A.P. Green Industries, et al. (7/7/04 IndCtApp) [Procedure; Costs]
Riley, Judge

In August of 2001, the Roberts filed the instant asbestos-related cause of action against approximately thirty-four defendants, * * * Subsequently, the Roberts filed their Motion for Expedited Jury Trial Date and Pre-Trial Conference, in which they alleged that William Lee Roberts, Jr., suffered from an incurable and fast-acting cancer, and requested an expedited trial date so that the matter could be tried before his death. On August 13, 2001, the trial court granted the Roberts’ motion, and set their jury trial for March 19, 2002.

On Thursday, March 14, 2002, during the first day of the final pre-trial conference, the defendants learned of the Roberts’ “contingency plan” to relocate the jury trial from the Marion County Superior Court 2 to a ballroom in the Indianapolis Athletic Club (IAC). The Roberts explained they developed their plan in anticipation of the impending jury trial that involved “more parties [than] the present courtroom can reasonably accommodate.” * * *

On March 19, 2002, the jury trial in this matter commenced at the IAC. On April 30, 2002, the Roberts filed their Motion to Allocate Courtroom Trial Expenses with the trial court. The trial court did not rule on the Roberts’ motion before the end of the trial on May 24, 2002. As of that date, thirty of the thirty-four defendants had either been dismissed from the trial or had settled with the Roberts. With regard to three of the four remaining defendants, the jury entered its verdict in favor of Defendants Central Soya Inc., Eli Lilly and Company, and the Kroger Company and against the Roberts. With regard to PSI Energy Inc. (PSI), the jury entered its verdict in favor of the Roberts and against PSI. The jury assessed 13% fault against PSI; therefore, of the combined award of $3,800,000 to the Roberts, PSI’s 13% portion was $494,000 with no punitive damages.

Thereafter, on June 12, 2002, the Roberts filed their Supplement to the Motion to Allocate Costs, in response to which the majority of defendants filed objections. As a result, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Roberts’ motion on July 18, 2002. On November 22, 2002, the trial court entered an order denying the Roberts’ motion, with the exception of its directive to defendants PSI, National Starch & Chemical Co., and Central Soya, Inc., to reimburse the Roberts the sum of $8,227.50 for their share of the document display system rental. On December 23, 2002, the Roberts filed their Motion to Correct Error, which was deemed denied on February 6, 2003. The Roberts now appeal. * * *

Therefore, we find ample evidence to show that the Roberts offered to shoulder the expense for moving the jury trial to the IAC in the interest of moving forward on the scheduled date of trial.

We have previously held that, although the expense of litigation confronts all litigants, unless otherwise provided by statute, rule, or agreement, each party bears his own expense. AgMax, Inc. v. Countrymark Co-op., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Given the circumstances in the case at bar, we are able to expand this well-settled notion to hold that, here, there was an agreement that the Roberts would pay for the jury trial expenses at the IAC, and that the trial court relied on that agreement in denying the defendants’ strenuous objections to proceeding with the jury trial at the IAC. Accordingly, we find that the mandate of I.C. § 33-5.1-2-12 was bypassed by the agreement, thereby relieving the city-county council of its obligation to provide and maintain a courtroom for the trial of this cause. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Roberts’ Motion to Allocate Courtroom Trial Expenses. * * * Affirmed.
KIRSCH, C.J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 7, 2004 02:09 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions