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Tuesday, August 10, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Five from Court of Appeals Today

Tom Richard Daggett, et al. v. Indiana State Police (8/10/04 IndCtApp) [Tort Claims Act]
Sullivan, Judge

Tom and Karen Daggett appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Indiana State Police (“ISP”). They present one issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in determining that the ISP was entitled to governmental immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). We affirm. * * *

Granting immunity to law enforcement officers who assist emergency medical professionals in restraining combative individuals who need medical treatment is within the scope of the “enforcement” provision of the ITCA. Law enforcement officials cannot be expected to arrive at the scene where medical professionals are attempting to provide treatment to an individual and determine whether that person is committing an act which is punishable as a crime or whether that person is “involuntarily” resisting treatment because they have no control over their physical capacities. Thus, we must conclude that when law enforcement officers respond to a request to assist in restraining combative patients, the officers are enforcing the law to the extent that they are preventing the patient from injuring himself and/or the medical professionals. As a consequence, they receive the protections of the “enforcement” immunity found in the ITCA. Holding otherwise would likely prevent the officers from performing a routine part of their job. The judgment is affirmed.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.

David Camm v. State of Indiana (8/10/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Barnes, Judge
David R. Camm appeals his three convictions for the murder of his wife and two children. We reverse.

Issues. The dispositive issue we address today is whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to present extensive evidence of extramarital sexual activity by Camm. For retrial purposes, we also address other issues that Camm has raised. * * *

We need not address any more issues in this case in detail. However, we do trust that some of the claimed instances of prosecutorial misconduct were unintentional and will not be repeated in any retrial, such as (1) questioning the defense blood spatter expert as to why his opinion conflicted with five other experts, when only two experts had testified for the State; (2) asking Camm why he did not think domestic violence was “a big deal” when there was no evidence that Camm had ever battered Kim; and (3) representing that a certain witness would be called later and could be questioned directly by defense counsel, then failing in fact to call that witness and protesting when defense counsel sought to do so.

Conclusion. Camm was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of extensive evidence and argument regarding his poor character, where the evidence regarding his philandering was not reasonably related to any proper purpose under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), including proof of motive. We reverse his three convictions for murder. Reversed.
CRONE, J., and BAKER, J., concur.

St. Joseph County Police Department v. Estate of Wayne Shumaker, et al. (8/10/04 IndCtApp) [Tort Claims Act]
Sillivan, Judge
[The St. Joseph police department brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment in a suit brought by Plaintiffs. Issue: whether the trial court erred in determining that the Department was not entitled to governmental immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”).] We reverse and remand.

* * * [H]ere we have not only the failure of the Department to follow the applicable laws, rules, and regulations itself (as was the case in Tittle), but also the failure of the Department to enforce the bond against Stroud. In other words, the Plaintiffs, by claiming that the Department negligently released Stroud without posting the proper bond, necessarily allege that the Department failed to enforce the law, i.e. compel the obedience of another (Stroud) to the applicable laws, rules, and regulations (the trial court’s bond order). This is essential to their claim of negligence. We therefore hold that the Department is entitled to immunity under Section 3(8). Furthermore, under the King analysis, the Department is within the scope of Section 3(8) immunity in that it is within the operational purpose or mission of the Department to enforce bond orders and run the jail. * * *

Because we hold that the Department is immune from suit under Section 3(8) of the ITCA, the trial court erred in denying the Department’s motion for summary judgment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.

Patrick J. McGraw, et al. v. Louis Marchiloi, et al. (8/10/04 IndCtApp) [Real property]
Vaidik, Judge
Patrick J. McGraw, P.J. Mac, Inc., and Jamison Inn Partnership (collectively, “McGraw”) appeal the trial court’s Order Approving Compromise and Settlement of Class Action. In particular, McGraw claims that the trial court erroneously enforced the settlement agreement because a condition contained within the mediated settlement agreement had not been satisfied. Because McGraw elected to go forward with the agreement even after realizing that the condition contained therein would not be satisfied, we find that McGraw waived the condition and cannot now attempt to avoid any obligation under the settlement agreement because the condition was not satisfied. Consequently, we affirm. * * *
SULLIVAN J., and MAY, J., concur.
Christopher M. Allen v. State of Indiana (8/10/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Baker, Judge
Appellant-defendant Christopher M. Allen appeals his convictions for three counts of Murder, a felony, and one count of Robbery, a class C felony, raising a number of alleged errors. Specifically, Allen asserts that the procedures involving the pre-trial identification of Allen as the suspect were tainted, that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to present evidence demonstrating that someone else had committed the offenses, that he was denied his right to due process of law because the State unreasonably delayed in bringing charges against him, and that he was denied the right to a fair trial because the jury verdict was prejudiced by improper extraneous influences. Allen also asserts that reversible error occurred when counsel were not notified of ex parte communications between the judge and the jury, that the results of certain tests performed by the State prior to trial were improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.

In this appeal, we address the issues that amount to reversible error, those that might recur on retrial if the same is warranted, and Allen’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. We conclude that the trial court’s exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony indicating that someone other than Allen had committed the offenses was reversible error. Similarly, we conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the results of certain tests that had been conducted as well as the testimony of an expert witness who had been retained by Allen. We also find that the trial court did not err in admitting pretrial and in-court identification evidence, that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of a witness who had died before the trial commenced, and that Allen was not denied due process as a result of the State’s delay in filing the charges against him. Finally, we find the evidence sufficient to support Allen’s convictions. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. * * *

Conclusion. In light of our discussion of the issues set forth above, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding Bethel’s testimony that was exculpatory and vital to Allen’s defense. We also find that it was error to exclude the reconstructive evidence and testimony from Lumpkin.

On the other hand, we hold that the trial court properly admitted the pretrial identification evidence with respect to the photo array, and there was no error in the exclusion of McGill’s testimony. We also conclude that Allen was not denied due process of law as a result of the State’s pre-indictment delay in bringing the charges against him, and we find that the evidence was sufficient to support Allen’s convictions. Given such a conclusion with regard to Allen’s sufficiency claim, the State is not barred from retrying Allen. See Joyner, 678 N.E.2d at 390. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on August 10, 2004 01:48 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions