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Tuesday, August 31, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Four from Supreme Court today

Travis J. Merlington v. State of Indiana (8/31/04) [Criminal Law & Procedure]Sullivan, Justice

Defendant Travis Jay Merlington was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The trial court enhanced the presumptive sentence of 30 years applicable here by an additional 15, for a total sentence of 45 years. Finding the mitigating circumstances in balance with the aggravating circumstances, we revise Merlington’s sentence to 30 years. * * *

Conclusion. We affirm Merlington’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine in excess of three grams with intent to deliver. We reverse his sentence of 45 years and remand to the trial court with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order and to issue or make any other documents or docket entries necessary to impose a sentence of 30 years, without a hearing.

Shepard, C.J., and Boehm and Rucker, JJ., concur. Dickson, J., dissents. [without opinion]

Paul M. McManus v. State of Indiana (8/31/04) [Criminal Law & Procedure; Constitutional Law]
Shepard, Chief Justice
Paul Michael McManus was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death. He challenges the constitutionality of Indiana’s death penalty statute and argues that his conviction is invalid due to evidentiary errors and his incompetence to stand trial. We affirm the conviction and sentence. * * *

I. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute. McManus challenges the constitutionality of the version of Indiana’s death penalty statute in effect at the time of his sentencing, claiming that it violates the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. * * *

A. Sixth Amendment. McManus argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the Indiana death penalty statute in effect at the time of his sentencing was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Specifically, he argues that under those cases the jury must find not only the aggravating circumstances, but must also find the mitigating circumstances and determine the balance between them. He says the statute is defective because the jury’s finding is not the final legal event but merely a prelude to the judicial finding contained in the court’s sentencing order.

Under Indiana’s statute as it read at the time of McManus’s trial, a jury could recommend death only if it found the existence of at least one statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. All of our post-Ring case law concludes that a defendant whose jury has made such a finding has received what Ring and Apprendi require. Our re-examination of Apprendi and Ring provide us with no reason to change that interpretation.

McManus makes a very similar contention about how the weighing of aggravators and mitigators must occur. We have previously held that “the determination of the weight to be accorded the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a ‘fact’ which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but is a balancing process.” Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind. 1994); see also Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 55 (Ind. 1998). After examining Apprendi and Ring, we recently re-affirmed the constitutionality of Indiana’s statute against arguments substantially similar to those raised by McManus. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004). * * *

Conclusion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.

In the Matter of Clifton Bruce Davidson, Jr. (8/31/04) [Attorney Disciplinary]
Per Curiam
The Disciplinary Commission has charged the respondent, Clifton Bruce Davidson, Jr., with six counts of attorney misconduct. Specifically, the Commission alleges that clients hired the respondent to represent them in various matters for which he accepted retainers and/or filing fees. After taking his clients’ money, the respondent took little or no action on his clients’ behalves and failed to respond to their inquiries about their cases. Ultimately, the respondent abandoned his law practice. Today we find, as did the hearing officer, that the respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law and for this misconduct should be disbarred.

In the Matter of Derek M. Cassady (8/31/04) [Attorney Disciplinary]
Per Curiam
By failing to hold settlement proceeds in trust for a third-party medical provider entitled to a portion of the proceeds, and instead by disbursing those earmarked funds to himself and his client, Indianapolis attorney Derek M. Cassady violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

By agreed resolution with the Disciplinary Commission, the respondent today asks us to approve a 30-day suspension for his attorney misconduct, with the entire period of suspension stayed so long as the respondent complies with certain probationary terms. Pursuant to Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23(11)(c), we approve the parties’ tendered resolution, and herein recount the facts and circumstances of this case. * * *

Posted by Marcia Oddi on August 31, 2004 02:49 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions