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Tuesday, September 07, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Two from Court of Appeals Today

Steven Lytle v. Ford Motor Company (9/7/04 IndCtApp) [Torts; Evidence, Daubert]
Baker, Judge

Nearly six years after we first issued an opinion in this action, this case is before us once again. Appellant-plaintiff Steven Lytle, appeals the entry of summary judgment granted in favor of appellee-defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) on his product liability claim against Ford for defective seatbelt design, alleging that the trial court erred in determining that evidence submitted by Lytle’s expert witnesses based on their observations and deductive reasoning was insufficient to oppose Ford’s “technical and scientifically relevant evidence based on reliable scientific principles.” More specifically, Lytle argues that the trial court erred in its application of Indiana Evidence Rule 702, that it improperly granted Ford’s motion to strike several affidavits and other exhibits on relevancy grounds and that it had improperly weighed the evidence at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. Concluding that the trial court properly granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment, we affirm. * * *

In light of our disposition of the issues set forth above, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the purported expert testimony of Horton and Dr. Khadilkar, inasmuch as Lytle failed to satisfy the requirements of Indiana Evidence Rule 702. We also note that the trial court did not err in striking the affidavits and excluding the exhibits that Lytle sought to admit in opposition to Ford’s motion for summary judgment. Finally, inasmuch as Ford presented evidence sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to Lytle’s claims against it, and Lytle failed to offer admissible evidence to counter that evidence in support of his claim against Ford once the burden had shifted to him, we conclude that summary judgment was properly entered for Ford. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.

Shaft Jones v. State of Indiana (9/7/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Baker, Judge
Appellant-defendant Shaft Jones appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine, a class D felony. See footnote Specifically, he raises three issues; however, we find one dispositive: whether the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. Finding that the search of a children’s backpack that was improperly seized from the vehicle violated Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights, we reverse and remand. * * *

The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. However, where there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, a warrantless search of the vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment because of the existence of exigent circumstances arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle. Further, as long as the search is supported by probable cause, a warrantless search of a vehicle may also include a search of a container or package found in the vehicle.

Here, the officers had received information that a black duffel bag had been involved in an armed robbery earlier in the day. However, there was no mention of a children’s backpack being involved in any crime. The simple fact that the children’s backpack was near a black duffel bag found a mile away from the scene of a robbery does not provide the police with probable cause to search the children’s backpack. Moreover, there was no indication that the vehicle was in any danger of disappearing while the officers obtained a warrant. No one was on the street at the time the officers approached the vehicle; more to the point, no one even came outside to see what the officers were doing until after they shined flashlights into the darkened houses in the vicinity. Tr. p. 68-69. Simply put, there were no exigent circumstances arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle. In this case, it is apparent that one officer could have gone to try to obtain a warrant while the other remained with the vehicle in case a prospective driver did appear.

Because the police lacked probable cause to search the children’s backpack and because no exigent circumstances existed, we find that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in this case. The officers were required to obtain a warrant before searching Jones’s vehicle. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Jones’s motion to suppress, and his conviction must be reversed.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.
KIRSCH, C.J., and ROBB, J., concur.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on September 7, 2004 02:05 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions