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Friday, November 05, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Court of Appeals posts five

George E. Goodwine v. J. William Goodwine, et al. (11/5/04 IndCtApp) [Trusts & Estates]
Baker, Judge

Appellant-plaintiff George E. Goodwine (“Goodwine”) appeals the trial court’s judgment against him and in the favor of appellees-defendants J. William Goodwine and Edward Kristoff (collectively, the “Trustees”). Specifically, Goodwine raises approximately fourteen issues, which we distill into two contentions. Goodwine argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Trustees did not breach any common law or statutory duties by: (1) planting a percentage of the farmland owned by the Trust with a clover/oat rotation instead of a corn/soybean rotation; and (2) planning to build a new tool shed for the use of a tenant of the farmland. Finding that the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Trustees, we affirm. * * *

The settlor intended to provide for current and future beneficiaries, safeguarding his legacy and his farmland. The Trustees have acted according to his intent and complied with the unambiguous Deed of Trust by employing a clover/oats rotation to protect and enhance the longevity of the soil, and by planning to construct a tool shed to help a current farmer tenant and to make the farmland more attractive to high-quality tenants in the future. Their actions have breached neither the spirit nor the letter of the trust instrument, nor any potentially applicable common law or statutory duties. There is no evidence in the record that they have in any way acted in bad faith or abused their discretion, and there is evidence in the record that all beneficiaries other than Goodwine have been happy with the Trustees. Therefore, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and the findings support its judgment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
KIRSCH, C.J., and ROBB, J., concur.

Robert J. Eads v. Perry Township Fire Department, et al. (11/5/04 IndCtApp) [Worker's Compensation]
Baker, Judge

Appellant-plaintiff Robert Eads appeals from the Full Worker’s Compensation Board’s (Board) decision in his case against appellees-defendants Perry Township Fire Department (Department), his employer, and Employer’s Security Insurance Company (ESI) awarding him no medical benefits for injuries he sustained while at work. Specifically, Eads raises three issues, but we find one dispositive: whether the Board erred in finding that Eads’s application was barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations. Finding no error, we affirm. * * *

The award of the Board is affirmed.
KIRSCH, C.J., and ROBB, J., concur.

Sean Strong v. State of Indiana (11/5/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Bailey, Judge

Case Summary. Appellant-Defendant Sean Strong (“Strong”) appeals his sixty-year sentence for murder. We remand for a new sentencing order.

Issue. Strong raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, all facts legally essential to his sentence when the trial court found certain aggravating circumstances and sentenced him to an enhanced term of sixty years. * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we remand for a new sentencing order consistent with the dictates of Blakely. Remanded.
SHARPNACK, J., and MAY, J., concur.

[Note.] Strong v. State is an important Blakely decision and essential reading for those following this issue. Recommended companion reading is Bloomington attorney Michael Ausbrook's analysis, available here at his blog, INCourts. Some quotes from his entry:

A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals (Judges Bailey, Sharpnack, and May) reversed an enhanced sentence for Murder today in Strong v. State, Court of Appeals No. 49A02-0401-CR-25 (Ind. Ct. App. November 5, 2004). This really is the first full-blown Blakely decision in Indiana and it does a number of important things besides simply applying Blakely:

It rejects the State's waiver arguments.

It remands for resentencing without saying anything about a sentencing jury.

Although not explicitly, the opinion practically invites a mitigated sentence, because the aggravating circumstances have to be set aside and there is at least one mitigating circumstance.

Lori A. White v. Brian D. White (11/5/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]
Sullivan, Judge

Lori White appeals from the trial court’s determination that the lien held by her former husband, which arose out of their property settlement, is a consensual lien. The sole issue she presents for our review is whether the lien should instead be classified as a judicial lien. * * *

Applying these definitions to the situation before us, we have a “judgment lien” as defined by the parties. Furthermore, its basis is a judgment against Lori created by the settlement agreement. At the time that the lien was created, the house was “nonexempt property” in the sense that the lien could be imposed upon that property and Brian could attach the property under the appropriate circumstances. Because a “judicial lien” is one obtained by judgment, the lien also qualifies as a “judicial lien” for purposes of Title 11 of the U.S. Code. Whether the bankruptcy court ultimately determines that the lien may be avoided such that the property is “exempt” for purposes of applying the bankruptcy provisions is a separate question. Needless to say, for purposes of Indiana law in classifying liens, a “judgment lien” is a “judicial lien.” The trial court’s determination that the lien is a “consensual lien” is reversed.
NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

John Glover v. State of Indiana (11/5/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Barnes, Judge

Case Summary. John Glover brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of his motion to suppress the testimony of his wife, Bobbie Glover, in his trial for the murder of Tammy Gibbs. We reverse.

Issue. We address one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erroneously found that the spousal privilege did not apply to Bobbie’s testimony. * * *

Glover filed a motion to suppress Bobbie’s testimony pursuant to the spousal privilege codified at [IC] 34-46-3-1. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. Specifically, the court found that the only purpose of the Glovers’ marriage was to assist Bobbie, who immigrated to the United States from India in 1999, to remain in this country legally. The court concluded that under these circumstances, where the purpose of the marriage was to defraud the federal government, even though the parties were legally married, they were “in no sense of the word . . . spouses,” and the spousal privilege did not apply. Glover appeals. * * *

In light of the nature of the more than one-hundred-year-old statutory privilege and its well-established exceptions, we decline the State’s request to follow federal law and create a “fraudulent” marriage exception to the spousal privilege. Such a creation is best left to the legislature.

Furthermore, to the extent the State argues that the Glovers’ marriage was fraudulent because John and Bobbie intended to defraud the federal government to evade immigration laws, we point out that there is no dispute that the marriage is lawful under the laws of Kentucky, and by extension is lawful in Indiana. Where we are concerned with applying a state statute in a state court proceeding, the relevant consideration is whether that marriage is lawful according to state law. The fact that Bobbie was Glover’s lawful wife “put the seal on her lips” and excluded her from being called as a witness against him unless one of the well-established exceptions to the privilege applied. State v. Chrismore, 274 N.W. 3, 5 (Iowa 1937) (holding that [w]hen the marriage ceremony is performed, no matter what the motive was or may be, the witness thenceforward becomes the lawful wife of defendant, and is prohibited under our statute from testifying against her husband, except where the offense is by the husband against her person.”)

Additionally, we believe accepting the State’s position would allow for the creation of numerous “exceptions” to the spousal privilege and create undue uncertainty in its application if courts were to routinely inquire into the “quality” of a marriage before determining whether the privilege applies. For this additional reason, we decline to judicially create a “fraudulent” marriage exception to the spousal privilege.

Conclusion. The trial court erred when it found that the spousal privilege did not apply to Bobbie’s testimony and denied Glover’s motion to suppress. We reverse. Reversed.
NAJAM, J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.
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Footnote: The spousal testimonial privilege differs from the statutory spousal privilege that we are addressing today. The spousal testimonial privilege can be invoked by either spouse to refuse to testify against the other whereas the statutory spousal privilege applies to communications between a husband and a wife.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on November 5, 2004 03:32 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions