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Thursday, November 18, 2004

Indiana Decisions - Four from the Court of Appeals

Leonard Proffit v. State of Indiana (11/18/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Sullivan, Judge

Following a jury trial, Appellant, Leonard Proffit, was convicted of one count of Voluntary Manslaughter, a Class A felony, and one count of Robbery as a Class B felony. Upon appeal, Proffit presents three issues for our review, which we renumber and restate as the following two: (1) whether the trial court improperly denied Proffit’s motion for a directed verdict upon the robbery charge, and (2) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury. We affirm. * * *
NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
Larry D. Best v. State of Indiana (11/18/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
[Interlocutory appeal]
Crone, Judge
Appellant-defendant Larry D. Best, Jr. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse. * * *

Jennings County’s decision not to take Best into custody, or to dismiss the warrant against him, subjected Best to deprivation of his liberty on four occasions. Enough is enough. We conclude that Best was served with the Jennings County warrant when he was first detained pursuant to it. At that time, the Jennings County warrant was satisfied and therefore lost its validity as a proper basis for future arrests. As Judge Staton explained in his dissent in Buck v. P. J. T., 182 Ind. App. 71, 75, 394 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1979), “[w]hen the warrant lacks legal purpose, its existence serves only as an impermissible barrier to due process.” We are not holding that every seizure, based on an arrest prompted by a computer mistake, warrants suppression of evidence, but the facts here clearly constitute an egregious violation of due process. Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Best’s motion to suppress. See Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that an unlawful arrest cannot be the foundation of a lawful search and that evidence which is the product of an illegal arrest is inadmissible). Reversed.
RILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.

Stephen Seketa v. State of Indiana (11/18/04 IndCtApp) [Criminal Law & Procedure]
Kirsch, Chief Judge
* * * While there is evidence that Seketa intended to confront Dixie about his lie, the evidence is insufficient to find the inmates agreed to commit an aggravated battery. While an agreement to humiliate Dixie or even to rough him up a little could be inferred, there is insufficient evidence to prove that Seketa conspired to commit a felony battery on Dixie. [cite omitted] Finding that the State presented insufficient evidence of conspiracy to commit aggravated battery, we reverse Seketa’s conviction on that count. Because we note that the trial court ordered Seketa’s sentences to run concurrently, we need not remand the case to address sentencing issues. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
BAKER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
Kristen Lynn Pryor v. David Eric Bostwick (10/26/04 IndCtApp) [Family Law]
[NFP, ordered published 11/16/04]
Najam, Judge
Kristin Lynn Pryor (“Mother”) appeals from two of the trial court’s orders finding her in contempt of court and calculating David Eric Bostwick’s (“Father”) child support obligation with respect to their child, A.B. She presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it found Mother in indirect contempt of court for failing to comply with a visitation order.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay $30 per week in child support.
3. Whether the trial court erred when it found Mother in direct contempt of court.
We reverse and remand with instructions. * * *

Mother first contends that the trial court erred when it found her in indirect contempt “for refusing to allow Father’s visitation” with A.B. prior to January 12, 2004. Mother maintains that because paternity had not been established prior to January 12, there could not have been any visitation order in effect. We must agree. * * *

Mother next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay $30 per week in child support. Specifically, Mother maintains that the trial court failed to base its order on the Child Support Guidelines, as it was required to do. Again, we must agree. * * *

Finally, Mother contends that the trial court erred when it found her in direct contempt for alleged negative remarks she made about the trial court and for her alleged noncompliance with some of the court’s orders. Specifically, Mother maintains that her conduct did not constitute direct contempt. We agree. * * *

In sum, the trial court erred when it found Mother in indirect contempt for allegedly violating a visitation order before the court had entered an order determining paternity. The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay $30 per week in child support without making findings to support that order or completing a child support worksheet. And the trial court erred when it found Mother in direct contempt for her conduct which occurred outside of the courtroom and was not within the trial judge’s personal knowledge.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
SULLIVAN, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on November 18, 2004 02:14 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions