Tuesday, March 08, 2005
Ind. Decisions - 7th Circuit posts 4 today
Winniczek, Hilary M. v. Nagelberg, Sheldon [duplicate of below]
Before BAUER, POSNER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. After we reversed the judgment, 394 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2005), the appellants submitted a bill of costs in the amount of $827. The appellee objects to certain items. One of his objections presents a novel question; hence this opinion. The bill of costs includes this court’s docketing fee of $250 * * *.
K., Casey v. St. Anne Commun 302 (CD Ill.) [21 pp.]
Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and POSNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal by an Illinois school district presents a novel issue concerning the scope of the “stay put” provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The Act requires states such as Illinois that accept federal funding for the education of disabled children to provide them with a “free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living.” [citations omitted] The particulars of the child’s program are required to be set forth in an “Individualized Education Program” devised by school officials in collaboration with the child’s parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Hearing officers resolve disputes regarding the IEP or its implementation. § 1415(f). * * * Affirmed.
SYKES, Circuit Judge, dissenting [see p. 9]. I respectfully dissent. Acacia Academy was not Casey K.’s “then-current educational placement” for purposes of the “stay-put” provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). * * *
Allstate Insurance v. Flanagan, Jay (ND Ill.) [6 pp.]
Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. Allstate petitions us under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) for leave to appeal the district court’s decision to certify under Rule 23(b)(2) a class of plaintiffs who allege that Allstate constructively discharged them in order to deprive them of benefits to which ERISA entitled them. We grant the petition (and proceed to decide the merits) because it presents a novel and important issue: whether certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is proper when, though injunctive or declaratory relief is sought rather than damages, individual hearings may be necessary to determine causation and hence liability. * * *
We conclude that this class action should have been certified, if at all, under Rule 23(b)(3) rather than under (b)(2). The certification is therefore VACATED.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 8, 2005 01:24 PM
Posted to Ind. (7th Cir.) Decisions