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Monday, December 19, 2005

Ind. Decision - Court of Appeals posts five, including one on whether a town may alter the terms of a statute by contract

In Ronald Taylor v. The Town of New Chicago the Town Council and the Board of Metropolitan Police Commissioners approved an employment contract for Taylor as chief of police that prohibited his removal without “good cause.” Among the terms of the contract:

It is understood by all of the parties to this Contract that there are various state statutes that govern tenure and termination of the police chief. The Council and Commission understand that this Contract gives Taylor rights that go beyond the provisions in applicable state statutes in regards to the removal of the Chief of Police. Any action to terminate this Contract may only be initiated by a “super majority” of both the Commission and the Council. The term “super majority” shall mean a three-fourth majority of all the members of each respective board. Furthermore, if such action becomes necessary, the matter shall be submitted to arbitration for preliminary and final determination. * * *

If the Council or the Commission is successful in terminating this Contract, the Town shall pay Taylor an amount equal to the Chief’s salary for the remainder of the Contract. * * *

The Council and Commission hereby declare it onerous upon themselves to terminate this Contract in absence of Good Cause. The Council and Commission agree that to do otherwise would impair the operation of the Police Department free from undue influence or interference subject to the orders and Rules/Regulations of the New Chicago Police Department and the Commission.

When a new Council was voted in, one of its first actions was to vote to terminate Taylor. Sheriff Taylor alleged that the Town had:
breached his employment contract by terminating him without good cause and by not complying with the termination procedure in the contract. Pursuant to the liquidated damages provision of the contract, Taylor demanded payment of $60,507.45, which represented the wages he was due under the contract.

New Chicago refused to pay and sought a declaratory judgment that Taylor’s employment contract with New Chicago was void, invalid and unenforceable. After a bench trial, the court found for New Chicago, ruling the employment contract impermissibly impaired the discretion of the successor town council to remove the police chief.

In a 9-page opinion, Judge May writes:
Whether a town council and a chief of police may enter into a valid and enforceable employment contract that permits termination only for good cause is a question of first impression. To resolve the issue, we first examine the town’s powers to act, including any legislative restrictions of those powers. We then consider whether Taylor’s employment contract impermissibly impinges on the powers thus granted. * * *

By purporting to grant Taylor specific rights regarding termination of his employment as police chief, the contract necessarily limited New Chicago’s power to act. * * * The question is whether the Council could so limit its own power. We hold New Chicago could not do so, Taylor’s contract is void, and the demotion and termination of police chiefs is controlled by Ind. Code §36-8-3-4(m). * * *

The Legislature has determined towns ought to retain the authority to remove a police chief without notice, hearing or good cause shown from the rank of chief. The town may not “bargain away” this authority and “by contract commi[t] it[self] to act in agreed manner.” As we noted in Pippenger, the law requires the town “retain its freedom of judgment up to the very moment it was required to act so that its decision when finally made would be influenced only by regard for public welfare” and not by contractual agreements and liability concerns. * * *

Accordingly, we hold New Chicago may not enter into a contract for the chief of police that would permit termination only for good cause. Such a provision would conflict with Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4(m), the Legislature’s explicit reservation of authority regarding the demotion and termination of police chiefs. Taylor’s contract with New Chicago is, therefore, void.

In In Re: The Estate of Rebecca A. Highfill, Kenneth Madley, Jr. v. PatriciaHighfill Judge May writes:
Kenneth Madley, Jr. ) appeals the judgment for Patricia Highfill, his former mother-in-law, regarding a disclaimer of proceeds of a life insurance policy on Rebecca Highfill, his former wife. He raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as: 1. Whether the disclaimer of Madley’s property interest was valid under the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (“UDPIA”); and 2. Whether Madley was fraudulently induced to sign the alleged disclaimer. We affirm.
Gregory J. Comer v. State of Indiana, an opinion by Judge Sharpnack, reverses and remands for resentencing.

In Leonard E. Eckstein v. State of Indiana defendant appeals the trial court’s order denying his Motion to Dismiss based on improper venue. Affirmed.

In Antoine Brown v. State of Indiana, Judge Crone concludes:

Simply asserting that he was in another county’s jail during his trial was not an adequate explanation for Brown’s absence when, as here, he was present at the time trial was set and when he chose not to communicate his predicament to his counsel or the trial court during the forty-five days that led up to his trial. We cannot say that the trial court’s finding that Brown waived his right to be present was error or an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on December 19, 2005 11:25 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions