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Tuesday, April 11, 2006

Ind. Decisions - Six today from the Court of Appeals

In Kelly Lawson v. State of Indiana, a 7-page opinion, Judge Mathias writes:

Kelly Lawson’s (“Lawson”) parole was revoked after he pled guilty to theft and resisting law enforcement. Thereafter, Lawson filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Laporte Superior Court arguing that he was entitled to immediate release because the parole board did not hold his parole revocation hearing within sixty days of his sentencing as required by Indiana Code section 11-13-3-10. Lawson’s writ was denied and he appeals raising several issues which we consolidate and restate as: whether the parole board erred when it revoked Lawson’s parole. Concluding that Lawson was not incarcerated due solely to an alleged violation of parole and that the parole board was required to revoke his parole pursuant to Indiana Code section 11-13-3-10(c), we affirm.
In Ford Motor Co., et al v. Marilyn Rushford, a 12-page opinion, Judge Sharpnack writes:
Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) and Eby Ford Lincoln Mercury a/k/a Eby Ford Sales, Inc. (“Eby”) appeal the trial court’s denial of their collective motion for summary judgment. Ford and Eby raise three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. * * *

The “circumstances” of this case include the facts that Rushford and her husband bought a vehicle from Eby, the vehicle contained air bag warnings on the sun visor and in the owner’s manual, Rushford told the salesman at Eby that she did not drive, the salesman did not tell her that there was an air bag warning in the owner’s manual, and Rushford did not read the owner’s manual.

The parties dispute whether it was reasonable for Eby to not advise Rushford of the warning in the owner’s manual based on Eby’s knowledge that Rushford did not drive.

In Scott A. Chatham v. State of Indiana, a 9-page opiion, Judge Sharpnack writes:
Scott A. Chatham appeals his conviction for sexual battery as a class D felony.1 Chatham raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. We reverse and remand.
In Nicholas Hite v. Vanderburgh Co. Office of Family & Children, a 17-page opinion, Judge Sharpnack writes:
Nicholas Hite (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights. Father raises two issues, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights is clearly erroneous because Father did not receive notice of the CHINS petition. We affirm.
Tom Williams v. State of Indiana - petition on rehearing, clarification

In M.C. Welding & Machining Co. Inc. v. Joseph Kotwa, a 15-page opinion, Judge Sharpnack writes:

M.C. Welding and Machining Company, Inc., (“M.C. Welding”) appeals the trial court’s judgment for Joseph Kotwa. M.C. Welding raises two issues, which we restate as: I. Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because Kotwa failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission; and II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment on Kotwa’s retaliatory discharge claim. * * *

While the trial court may not have had subject matter jurisdiction over the discrimination claims, it was “not ousted of subject matter jurisdiction” over the retaliatory discharge claim. Austin Lakes, 648 N.E.2d at 646. Consequently, M.C. Welding’s argument fails. The trial court had jurisdiction over Kotwa’s retaliatory discharge claim. * * *

In summary, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction over Kotwa’s retaliatory discharge claim and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the claim. M.C. Welding argues that the jury’s verdict should not stand because “it is impossible to determine if the judgment is based on the retaliatory discharge claim or the claims for which subject matter jurisdiction was lacking” and that the verdict is uncertain and ambiguous. However, such an assertion goes against the well-settled principle that “a general verdict will be sustained if the evidence is sufficient to sustain any theory of liability.” PSI Energy, Inc., 829 N.E.2d at 950. Because the evidence is sufficient to sustain the retaliatory discharge claim, the general verdict will be sustained.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on April 11, 2006 11:05 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions