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Thursday, June 29, 2006

Ind. Decisions - More decisions today from the Supreme Court, including one on special laws

In Henry Luke Kellems v. State of Indiana, a 5-page opinon, Justice Sullivan writes:

As noted earlier, Kellems was tried and convicted in a bench trial. The trial record, how-ever, does not reflect that Kellems made a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial. The record does indicate that Kellems was initially informed of his right to jury trial and his option to waive that right at a pre-trial hearing held on March 28, 2002. Kellems was asked if he had any questions regarding his rights and he responded negatively.

Kellems’s attorney, Terry White, indicated his client’s desire to waive his jury trial right at a status conference held on May 5, 2003, at which Kellems was present. White informed the trial court that after engaging in lengthy conversation with Kellems, his client had decided to forego a jury trial. The trial judge, however, never questioned Kellems himself regarding the voluntariness of his waiver nor elicited any statement from Kellems of his waiver for the record. * * *

The trial court did not secure a waiver from Kellems personally. Its failure to do so—and to ensure that the waiver was reflected in the record—necessitates granting Kellems a new trial.

Conclusion. Kellems’s Petition for Rehearing is granted. The judgment of the trial court is reversed on the basis of its failure to secure a personal waiver from Kellems to his right to jury trial. The matter is remanded for a new trial.

Travis D. Garrison v. Charles E. Metcalf - procedural issue.

In Alpha Psi Chapter of Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Auditor of Monroe County, a 13-page opinion (Sullivan's dissent begins on p. 11), Chief Justice Shepard writes:
The Indiana Constitution prohibits special laws which grant privileges to a few people that are not available to others. The statutory amendment in this case exempted three taxpayers, after the fact, from tax deadlines applicable to everyone else. The trial court was right to uphold the Constitution.

The Alpha Psi Chapter of Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity, Inc., Lamdba Corporation, and Delta Alpha of Alpha Tau Omega, Inc. (hereinafter “taxpayers”) each failed to file timely applications for property tax exemptions for their property in Monroe County.1 Their failure to do so resulted in the assessment of property tax against their real estate in 2000 and 2001, with the tax due and payable in 2001 and 2002 respectively. During its 2003 session, the Indiana General Assembly passed Public Law 256-2003.2 2003 Ind. Acts 2603. Section 44 of the act retroactively provided what amounted to a filing extension that permitted the taxpayers to apply for their 2000 and 2001 property tax exemptions in 2004 and required the county auditor to grant those exemptions.

[the law quoted refers specifically "to property that: (1) is used for a fraternity for students attending Indiana University" and gets even narrower]

In July 2003 one of the taxpayers, Pi Kappa Phi, requested that the Monroe County Auditor refund the taxes paid on its property pursuant to Section 44. Rather than issuing the refund, the Auditor filed for declaratory judgment in the Monroe Circuit Court, naming all three taxpayers and contending that Section 44 was unconstitutional as a special law.3

In December 2004, the Monroe Circuit Court granted the Auditor’s request for a declaratory judgment, and held the relevant section of Public Law 256-2003 unconstitutional under Article IV, Section 22 and Article IV, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. The appeal of the order is directly here under Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(b) (cases where a statute has been held unconstitutional). Concluding that the trial court was correct under Section 23, we need not analyze the Section 22 questions. * * *

Conclusion. To the drafters of the 1851 Constitution, this was precisely the sort of “special law” that caused so much consternation, consumed so much time, and created so much inequality that it required a constitutional provision to eliminate. We conclude the trial court was correct to uphold the Constitution, and we affirm its judgment.

Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Sullivan, J., dissents with separate opinion. [which begins]

My disagreement with my colleagues’ approach to assessing the constitutionality of “special legislation” is of record and I incorporate it by reference rather than prolong the discussion here. See City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003) (Sullivan, J., dissenting); State v. Hoovler, 668 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 1996) (Sullivan, J., concurring in result). Suffice it to say that I believe the Court’s analysis in today’s case violates in several respects the Separation of Functions Clause proscription on the Judiciary “exercis[ing] any of the functions” of the Legislature. Ind. Const. art. III, § 1.

In Danny E. Brown, Jr. v. Ginger Brown, an 8-page opinion, Justice Sullivan writes:
Because of Danny Brown’s disability, his son received a lump-sum distribution of retro-active Social Security disability benefits as well as monthly benefits going forward. Brown seeks credit for the lump-sum payment against an accumulated child support arrearage and credit for the monthly benefits against his future support obligation. Following precedent from this State and others, we hold that a disabled parent is entitled to credit against the parent’s child sup-port obligations for Social Security disability benefits paid to a child, effective as of the date the parent files a petition to modify a support order. The petition may be filed upon application for disability benefits.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on June 29, 2006 01:53 PM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions