« Ind. Law - Part I of: Should the General Assembly make the law available to the citizens of the State? | Main | Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues four rulings today »

Wednesday, June 14, 2006

Ind. Decisions - Supreme Court issues five decisions today

In Jeffrey Patrick, City of Gary & City of Gary Police Department v. Richard Miresso, a 5-page opinion, Justice Dickson writes:

In accordance with our decision in Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1993), we hold that a governmental unit and its police officer are not immune from liability for injuries caused by the officer's negligent operation of a police vehicle while pursuing a fleeing suspect. * * *

In addition, we observe that the immunity provisions set out in § 34-13-3-3 of the ITCA have been amended eleven times since Quakenbush was handed down in 1993,6 but without any change that would alter the outcome in Quakenbush. The continued viability of this precedent is thus further supported by the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. [emphasis supplied]

In City of Indianapolis and Indianapolis Police Department v. Richard Garman, a 3-page opinion, Justice Dickson writes:
In accord with our decision today in Patrick v. Miresso, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2006), we affirm the denial of summary judgment and hold that a governmental unit is not immune from liability for injuries caused by its police officer's negligent operation of a police vehicle while pursuing a fleeing suspect. * * *

In our decision today in Patrick, we discuss King and Benton, concluding that these deci-sions do not impair or undermine our decision in Quakenbush, and we emphasize the legisla-ture's acquiescence to Quakenbush. In Patrick, we reassert the viability of the holding in Quakenbush that the Tort Claims Act "'enforcement of . . . a law' immunity does not shield gov-ernmental entities and personnel from liability resulting from a breach of the statutory duty to operate emergency vehicles 'with due regard for the safety of all persons.'" Patrick, ___ N.E.2d at ___, slip op. at 5 (quoting Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8(d)(1)).

In Roger D. Childress v. State of Indiana and Gary L. Carroll v. State of Indiana, a 12-page ruling involving plea agreements (including a 1-page concurring opinion), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rucker, rules that:
Of course a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met this inappropriateness standard of review. But to say that a defendant has acquiesced in his or her sentence or has implicitly agreed that the sentence is appropriate undermines in our view the scope of authority set forth in Article VII, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution. We thus disapprove of language in Gist, Mann, and their progeny providing otherwise. See n.2.
Jerry Reyes v. State of Indiana - we proceed to address Reyes’ inappropriateness claim in light of our decision today in Childress.

In David Weiss v. State of Indiana, a 5-page opinion, Justice Rucker writes:

The underlying rationale for the [appeals] court’s holding is that by entering into such agreements the defendant either acquiesced in or implicitly agreed to the sentence imposed. In an opinion handed down today we disagreed with this proposition and held instead that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)
articulates a standard of review designed as guidance for appellate courts. . . . Of course a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met this inappropriateness standard of review. But to say that a defendant has acquiesced in his or her sentence or has implicitly agreed that the sentence is appropriate undermines in our view the scope of authority set forth in Article VII, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution. We thus disapprove of language in Gist, Mann, and their progeny providing otherwise.
Childress v. State, No. 61S01-0510-CR-484, ___N.E.2d___, ___, slip op. at 9 (Ind. June 14, 2006). Accordingly, we proceed to address Weiss’ inappropriateness claim.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on June 14, 2006 12:58 PM
Posted to Indiana Decisions