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Thursday, June 07, 2007

Ind. Decisions - One (now two) today from the 7th Circuit [Updated]

In U.S. v. Jeremy D. Hagenow (ND Ind., Robert L. Miller, Jr., Chief Judge), a 7-page opinion, Judge Williams writes:

In this appeal, we consider for the second time Jeremy Hagenow’s sentence for his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. At the initial sentencing hearing, the government introduced an affidavit attached to an information to demonstrate that Hagenow’s prior conviction for criminal confinement was for a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the sentencing enhancement provided in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. Subsequent case law made clear that such an affidavit was not an acceptable way of showing that a conviction constituted a crime of violence. At the sentencing hearing on remand, the government introduced instead the plea colloquy transcript from Hagenow’s criminal confinement matter. Because we conclude that the district court properly allowed the government on remand to introduce, for the first time, the plea colloquy transcript in support of its argument that the conviction was for a crime of violence, we affirm. * * *

We are satisfied that only after the initial sentencing did case law make clear that the affidavit should not have been utilized to demonstrate that Hagenow’s prior conviction constituted a crime of violence for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement. We believe this intervening case law warrants a departure from the general rule that the government does not receive multiple opportunities to present evidence in support of a sentencing enhancement. As a result, the district court did not err when it allowed the government to introduce the plea colloquy for the first time on remand.

In John M. Floyd v. State Financial Bank (ND Ind., Theresa L. Springmann, Judge), an 8-page opinion, Judge Kanne concludes:
The terms of the contract between Floyd and Star are unambiguous. The agreement does not require that Star exclusively consult with Floyd, and the contract does not require that Star pay for the preliminary ideas that Floyd presented. The district court was correct that Star did not breach its contract with Floyd when it used other vendors to implement the overdraft policy and sell its credit card portfolio. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on June 7, 2007 10:32 AM
Posted to Ind. (7th Cir.) Decisions