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Thursday, June 21, 2007

Ind. Decisions - Two today from the Supreme Court [Updated]

In George Reyes v. State of Indiana, a 7-page, 5-0 opinion, in a case in which oral arguments were heard Jan. 25, 2007, Justice Sullivan writes:

Courts have adopted two principal methods for determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings: a “balancing test” that weighs the probationer’s interest in confronting the declarant against the State’s interest in not producing same; and a “substantial trustworthiness test” that determines the reliability of the evidence. For the reasons set forth in this decision, we adopt the substantial trustworthiness test. * * *

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause applies to probation revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). But there is no right to probation: the trial court has discretion whether to grant it, under what conditions, and whether to revoke it if conditions are violated. Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1992) (citations omitted). It should not surprise, then, that probationers do not receive the same constitutional rights that defendants receive at trial. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999).

The due process right applicable in probation revocation hearings allows for procedures that are more flexible than in a criminal prosecution. * * * [C]ourts may admit evidence during probation revocation hearings that would not be permitted in a full-blown criminal trial. * * *

This does not mean that hearsay evidence may be admitted willy-nilly in a probation revocation hearing. Morrissey outlined the minimum requirements to satisfy due process in a parole revocation hearing. Though the Supreme Court listed the confrontation right as one of those minimum requirements—holding in a parenthetical that a hearing officer may only deny the right with good cause—the Court also issued a caveat: “We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” * * *

We affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that Retz’s affidavits were properly admitted, but hold that the trial court should have applied a test of “substantial trustworthiness” in so doing. We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), as to all other issues not addressed in this opinion.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur. Rucker, J., concurs in result without separate opinion.

In Corey Mills v. State of Indiana, a 10-page, 5-0 opinion, in a case in which there was not oral argument, Justice Sullivan writes:
While Corey Mills argues correctly that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon may not have his or her sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute by proof of the same felony used to establish that the person was a “serious violent felon,” Mills is not entitled to the post-conviction relief he seeks here. Mills relinquished the right to challenge this aspect of his sentence when he pled guilty.

Posted by Marcia Oddi on June 21, 2007 01:18 PM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions