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Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 6 today (and 12 NFP)

For publication opinions today (6):

In Gary School Corporation v. Tom Powell , a 9-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

Tom Powell worked for Gary Community School Corporation (Gary) as a full-time teacher and a part-time football coach. After taking a medical leave of absence, he was restored to his teaching position but not to his coaching position. He sued the school under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).1 The FMLA, however, applies only to full-time employees. We must determine, therefore, whether we look at the total number of hours Powell worked for Gary, in which case the coaching position would be covered by the FMLA, or whether we should instead examine the jobs separately, in which case the teaching position would be covered by the FMLA and the coaching position would not be. After examining the record, we find that because the parties herein treated the jobs as entirely separate and independent of one another, we must follow their lead and examine the jobs separately for the purpose of FMLA coverage. Consequently, Powell’s part-time coaching position was not eligible for FMLA coverage and the trial court should have granted summary judgment in Gary’s favor. * * *

We hasten to add that this holding is limited to situations in which an employee works in multiple capacities for the same employer and the employer and employee treat those capacities completely separately and independently. It is entirely possible that an employee could perform multiple functions for the same employer but, because of the nature of their employment relationship, the employee would be considered to have only one job, encompassing all hours worked for the employer in any capacity, for the purpose of determining FMLA eligibility. Here, however, that was not the case.

In South Bend Comm. School Corp. v. Linda D. Lucas, a 14-page, 2-1 opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:
Appellant-employer South Bend Community School Corporation (South Bend) appeals the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Review Board (the Board) awarding unemployment insurance benefits to appellee-claimant Linda D. Lucas. South Bend argues that the Board erroneously determined that the Head Start Consortium of Elkhart and St. Joseph Counties (Head Start) is not an educational institution within the meaning of the relevant statute such that Lucas is eligible for unemployment insurance during the summer breaks between Head Start’s academic terms. Concluding that the legislature intended for Head Start to be treated as an educational institution, we reverse the decision of the Board. * * *

Given the purpose of the Unemployment Act and the way in which Head Start is structured and operated, we can only conclude that the legislature intended that Head Start be treated as an educational institution for the purpose of unemployment compensation. Thus, the Board’s decision was contrary to legislative intent and necessarily unreasonable. The judgment of the Board is reversed.

SHARPNACK, J. concurs.
RILEY, J., dissents with opinion. [which concludes] In light of the evidence before us, I remind the majority of its quoted standard of review that “[w]hen a court is faced with two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, the court should defer to the agency.” [cite omitted] Based on the numerous differences that exist between the Head Start program—not in the least its funding and accreditation—and what is customarily regarded as a school, the Board reasonably and consistently interpreted the statute by excluding Head Start as an educational institution. Accordingly, by disregarding its own standard, I believe the majority reached the wrong result. I would affirm the Board’s decision in all regards.

Margaret Ritcheson-Dick v. Unemployment Ins. Review Board, Ind. Dept. of Workfoce Dev., and Deutsche Post Global Mail, LTD. - "Margaret Ritcheson-Dick (“Margaret”) appeals the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development’s (“Review Board”) dismissal of her appeal. Concluding that the Review Board abused its discretion by not hearing Margaret’s additional evidence on the issue of whether she timely appealed the decision suspending her unemployment insurance benefits, we reverse and remand for further proceedings."

In KLN v. State of Indiana, a 12-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

K.L.N., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent and confined to a secure facility for 120 days. As a result of K.L.N.’s unwillingness to follow the rules of the facility, the juvenile court modified the terms of his dispositional decree to include an order that K.L.N. follow those rules. After K.L.N. amassed three new incident reports, the probation department filed a rule to show cause, resulting in the court finding K.L.N. in civil contempt of court and imposing an additional term of confinement for the contempt finding. Although the juvenile court informed K.L.N. that for every day of good behavior on his original confinement one day would be subtracted from the contempt confinement, there was no way in which K.L.N. could have immediately purged himself of the contempt finding. Moreover, there is no statutory authority for the course of action taken by the juvenile court herein. Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court erred by holding K.L.N. in contempt and lengthening his term of confinement.

Appellant-respondent K.L.N. appeals the juvenile court’s order finding him in indirect civil contempt for failing to obey the rules of the facility to which he was committed for 120 days and adding 77 days to his term of detention in the facility. Finding that the juvenile court did not have authority to take these actions, we reverse.

Robert Henson v. State of Indiana - "Robert Henson appeals his sentence for two counts of burglary as class C felonies. Henson raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences totaling twelve years violated Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c). We reverse and remand for resentencing."

In Karen Rush v. State of Indiana , a case out of Huntington County, Chief Judge Baker concludes in a 13-page opinion:

In this case, the evidence showed that there were approximately twenty-five people at Rush’s house on the night of the party. And Rush knew that people were coming into her house to visit her seventeen-year-old daughter. When some of the guests brought alcohol into the house through the front door, Rush was in the living room. At least one individual talked with Rush after he had been drinking in the basement. Contrary to Rush’s claim that “there was no indication that anything unusual was taking place in the home,” she admitted to police officers that she had seen beer cans in the house. Indeed, the police officers discovered a number of empty beer cans and liquor bottles scattered in the basement. Moreover, Rush’s daughter was one of the juveniles who had been drinking that evening, and the evidence showed that she had talked with Rush during the course of the evening.

Although the evidence may not have established that Rush actually supplied the juveniles with alcohol, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Rush knew that the minors were drinking in her basement when considering the amount of alcohol that was in the house and the number of individuals who were coming and going from the residence. Moreover, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Rush aided the minors in permitting them to consume alcohol in her home. As a result, we affirm Rush’s conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

NFP civil opinions today (3):

Kevin Cardwell v. Patricia Grigsby (NFP) - "Appellant-respondent Kevin M. Cardwell appeals the trial court’s decree of adoption, pursuant to which Cardwell’s daughter Amber—with whom he had had no contact for twelve years—was adopted by appellee-petitioner Patricia A. Grigsby, who essentially raised Amber, and Cardwell’s parental rights were terminated. Initially, we observe that Amber became eighteen years old on November 22, 2007. Because no parental consent is required for adoption of a person who has attained the age of eighteen, Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1, and it is undisputed that Amber wants to be adopted by Grigsby, this case is moot. Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991) (noting that a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court)."

Alan D. Reed v. Employee Plans, LLC (NFP) - "Appellant-plaintiff Alan D. Reed appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee-defendant Employee Plans, LLC (Employee Plans), on Reed’s complaint against Employee Plans for breach of contract. Reed argues that the trial court should have concluded that he is entitled to commissions for the period of time beginning with the termination of his employment as an insurance brokerage agent and ending with the provision of a written notice of termination by Employee Plans of the parties’ contract. Finding that the trial court’s summary judgment order was proper, we affirm."

Robert Nesbitt v. Katie Jackel (NFP) - "Appellant-plaintiff Robert Nesbitt appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee-defendant Katie Jackel regarding his legal malpractice claim against Jackel. Specifically, Nesbitt argues that the trial court abused its discretion in striking his expert witness’s affidavit regarding the standard of care of an estate planning attorney. Moreover, Nesbitt argues that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Jackel committed legal malpractice in drafting Nesbitt’s estate planning documents. Concluding that the trial court properly struck the expert witness’s affidavit and properly granted summary judgment for Jackel, we affirm."

NFP criminal opinions today (9):

Pedro Ramos v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jimmy E. Morris v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Kelvin Shermon v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Paul F. Holcomb v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Robert Louis Ramsey v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Robert F. Futrell v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Sollie A. Nance v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Edward A. Spencer V. State of Indiana (NFP)

H.M. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on February 19, 2008 01:42 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions