The Indiana Law Blog: Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 16 NFP)

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Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 16 NFP)

For publication opinions today (3):

In JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Laura & Dennis Brown, et al, an 8-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

The parties’ arguments require us to interpret Indiana Code section 28-9-4-2. Specifically, we must determine whether a depository financial institution that has received notice of garnishment proceedings pursuant to Indiana Code section 28-9-3-4(d) is required to restrict withdrawal of funds that are subsequently deposited into the account.

Appellant-garnishee-defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMorgan) appeals the small claims court’s order finding it in contempt and entering judgment of $1,045.99 in favor of appellees-plaintiffs Laura Brown, Dennis Brown, and Green, Richard & Trent (the Collection Agency) (collectively, the appellees). Specifically, JPMorgan argues that the trial court erroneously found it to be in contempt because, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Indiana Financial Institutions Adverse Claims Act (the Act), JPMorgan was only required to restrict withdrawal of funds in an amount equal to the balance of appellee-defendant Rebecca Recht’s account at the time JPMorgan received notice of the garnishment proceedings.

In light of the amendment the legislature made to Indiana Code section 28-9-4-2 in 1998, we conclude that JPMorgan was only required to restrict withdrawal of funds in an amount equal to the balance of Recht’s account at the time it received notice. Thus, we reverse the small claims court’s decision to hold JPMorgan in contempt for failing to restrict withdrawal of funds that were subsequently deposited into Recht’s account. * * *

In light of the legislature’s amendment to Indiana Code section 28-9-4-2, we agree with JPMorgan that the statute only required it to restrict withdrawal of the balance in Recht’s account at the time it received the documents and process required by Indiana Code section 28-9-3-4(d). The legislature’s decision to omit the words “or subsequently deposited into” from Indiana Code section 28-9-4-2 is irrefutable and, as required by the rules of statutory construction, we will not reinsert the omitted language into the statute when construing the statute. Thus, we agree with JPMorgan that the trial court erred by finding it in contempt for failing to restrict withdrawal of funds that were subsequently deposited into Recht’s account. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the small claims court with regard to the contempt order.5 The judgment of the small claims court is reversed.

In Katherine and Gary Hoesman v. Daniel Sheffler and Constance Pleasant, a 23-page opinion, Judge Robb writes:

This case involves an attempt by Katherine and Gary Hoesman to collect a judgment ordered in their favor and against Julia Sheffler, who converted money from a trust fund established for the benefit of the Hoesmans. The Hoesmans appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Constance Johnson, Julia’s mother, and denying the Hoesmans’ motions to amend their complaint and to consolidate this case with another. On appeal, the Hoesmans raise four issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the Hoesmans’ fraudulent transfer claim;
2. Whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the Hoesmans’ claim that they held a statutory lien on property transferred to Constance and that this lien has priority over a security interest held by Constance; and
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Hoesmans’ motions to amend their complaint and their motions to consolidate this suit with a prior related suit.

Daniel Sheffler, Julia’s husband and a defendant in this suit, also raises the issue of whether the trial court’s denials of the Hoesmans’ motions for leave to amend their complaint and to consolidate are issues properly before this court.

We conclude the trial court’s denial of the Hoesmans’ motions to amend and to consolidate are not properly before this court, and therefore do not address the propriety of these decisions. Concluding that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Constance on the Hoesmans’ claims regarding fraudulent transfers and the priority of their lien, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

In Paternity of R.J.S., Robert and Linda Mullen v. Anthony and Mary Stockton, Amanda Stockton, a 9-page opinion, Judge Barnes writes:

Robert and Linda Mullen appeal the dismissal of their petition to establish paternity of R.J.S. We affirm.

Issue. The dispositive issue is whether the Mullens, as alleged paternal grandparents, have standing to seek an order establishing paternity of R.J.S. * * *

The trial court’s dismissal of the Mullens’ petition to establish paternity of R.J.S. was proper because they lack standing to file such a petition.

NFP civil opinions today (5):

Charles Garrido, Jr. v. Key Bank, N.A. (NFP) - "The sole restated issue is whether a release Garrido signed after termination of his employment with McDonald Investments, Inc., absolved him of liability for a Key Bank promissory note that he co-signed. * * *

"Genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the intended scope of the release Garrido executed. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Key Bank and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

Termination of Parental Rights of B.S.; Deborah S. v. Marion County Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc. (NFP) - Termination; affirmed.

Steven C. Dodds and Kellie R. Dodds v. Stephen Hay, et al. (NFP) - "Appellants-plaintiffs Steven C. Dodds and Kellie R. Dodds appeal the judgment entered in favor of appellees-defendants Stephen M. Hay, Nura K. Turner, and John P. Turner (collectively, the appellees) following a bench trial on the Doddses’ complaint against the appellees for declaratory judgment and to quiet title. Specifically, the Doddses raise the following arguments: (1) the trial court erroneously found that they were collaterally estopped from making certain arguments because of an order entered in a 1987 quiet title action; and (2) the trial court erroneously found that the Doddses have failed to establish title to a portion of their driveway encroaching on the appellees’ property by adverse possession or a prescriptive easement. Finding no error, we affirm."

Wayne E. Sinn v. Pen Products, Nancy Broglin, et al (NFP) - "Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Sinn has waived his arguments on appeal by failing to support them with cogent reasoning."

In Kelley Partners, Inc. v. Quailty Oil Company, Inc. (NFP), a 7-page opinion, Judge Kirsch writes:

Quality Oil Company, Inc. (“Quality Oil”) filed a complaint against Kelley Partners, Inc. (“Kelley Partners”) alleging breach of contract. Kelley Partners appeals the trial court’s determination that Indiana had personal jurisdiction over Kelley Partners in this matter, claiming that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Indiana and that maintenance of the suit against it offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. We reverse. * * *

We do not believe the contacts in this case are such as to permit Indiana courts to exercise jurisdiction over Kelley Partners. Kelley Partners is not generally engaged in business in Indiana. Its agents did not come to Indiana to offer or negotiate an agreement with Quality Oil. Its contact with the state was initiated by Quality Oil and consisted of interstate phone calls and faxes to place orders with Quality Oil and three visits to Indiana by Mr. Kelley over a ten-year period. Kelley Partners does not have the minimum contacts required to establish personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial court erred in its determination that Indiana had personal jurisdiction over Kelley Partners, and Kelley Partners’ motion to dismiss should have been granted. Reversed.

NFP criminal opinions today (11):

Theodore Johnson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Toby J. Maxwell v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Eric S. Jett v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jason Burnam v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Travis Ratliff v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Leighann J. Mitchell v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Sharico Devon Blakely v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Yvonne M. Broadnax v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Carissa A. Miller v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Laron W. Edwards v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Anessa B. Bennett v. State of Indiana (NFP)