The Indiana Law Blog: Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 7 today (and 15 NFP)

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Friday, June 13, 2008

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 7 today (and 15 NFP)

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For publication opinions today (7):

In Marion County and St. Joseph County v. State of Indiana; Tim Berry; Richard Mourdock, et al, a 19-page opinion, Judge May writes:

For many years, Indiana counties have been required to pay a portion of the cost of operating juvenile detention facilities. When the State attempted to collect a combined arrearage of approximately $75 million from Marion and St. Joseph Counties, the Counties filed a lawsuit seeking relief from their debts. The trial court entered summary judgment for the State, and we affirm. * * *

The Counties raise several issues on appeal: (1) whether the Counties have standing to bring this suit; (2) whether the Counties’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (3) whether the Counties’ claims are barred by the doctrine of laches; (4) whether Art. 9, § 2 of the Indiana Constitution requires the State to pay all costs of operating juvenile facilities; (5) whether the State’s failure to comply with signature and attestation requirements renders the accounts invalid; and (6) whether the trial court erred by holding the State could recoup expenses for facilities other than Plainfield and Indianapolis. * * *

It appears the General Assembly has always intended counties to bear part of the costs of housing juvenile offenders in the entire state system. When Ind. Code § 4-24-7-2 was enacted, Plainfield and Indianapolis were the only juvenile facilities in Indiana. When the General Assembly reorganized the DOC in 1979, it enacted Ind. Code § 11-10-2-3 to permit the DOC to recoup costs of keeping a juvenile “in the facility or program to which he is assigned.” Because the DOC now had the authority to determine which facilities to operate and to assign juveniles to specific facilities, it no longer made sense for the General Assembly to identify specific facilities in the statutes. Therefore, Ind. Code § 11-10-2-3 refers generally to the facility or program to which the juvenile is assigned. Because the Counties were in arrears by 2005, we believe the 2005 amendment to Ind. Code § 42-4-7-2 was intended to clarify, and not to change, the law. * * * Therefore, we conclude the DOC had authority to charge the Counties for expenses incurred at all facilities.

Conclusion. The Counties have standing to assert their claims, and their claims are not barred by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches. However, we conclude the trial court correctly decided the merits of the Counties’ claims, and we affirm. Affirmed.

Wendell Iddings v. Darran T. Cole - "Wendell Iddings, pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to compel his former counsel, Darran T. Cole, to deliver over money. We affirm. * * * Given the evidence presented, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Iddings was not entitled to any portion of the money paid to Cole."

In Olympus Properties, LLC v. Jason Plotzker , an 8-page opinion, Judge May writes:

After Jason Plotzker breached one lease, Olympus Properties, LLC, repudiated a subsequent lease. Plotzker commenced an emergency possessory action in small claims court, and the court awarded Plotzker possession of the apartment and attorney fees. Because Plotzker was not a tenant as defined by statute, we reverse and remand. * * *

Plotzker argues he was a tenant because he had the right to occupy the apartment during the lease period. Plotzker, however, never had possession of or control over the apartment. Olympus repudiated the lease before Plotzker’s right to occupy the apartment commenced. Accordingly, Plotzker is not entitled to the statutory remedies of a tenant. Because Plotzker was not a tenant, he could not proceed in small claims court under Ind. Code §§ 33-29-2-4(b)(2) or (3).2 However, Plotzker is entitled to a remedy under contract law for Olympus’ breach of the lease, and the small claims court had jurisdiction pursuant to Ind. Code § 33-29-2-4(b)(1), which confers jurisdiction over civil actions for damages of $6,000 or less. * * *

The small claims court had jurisdiction to hear Plotzker’s case. However, because Plotzker was not a tenant, the court could not award injunctive relief or attorney fees pursuant to the landlord-tenant statutes. Therefore, we remand for the court to determine the amount of Plotzker’s damages, if any, and whether he is entitled to attorney fees.

In Michael Lukis v. Ray Blackburn, et al, a 15-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

Appellant-respondent Michael Lukis appeals the trial court’s order determining that the way in which the Indiana Natural Resources Commission (NRC) evaluated the parties’ respective riparian rights was contrary to law and remanding the matter for reconsideration. Lukis argues that in arriving at that result, the trial court overstepped its authority on judicial review of an administrative action. Finding that the trial court erroneously concluded that the NRC’s determination was contrary to law, we reverse. * * *

Lukis argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the way in which the NRC calculated the parties’ respective riparian zones was contrary to law. The appellees disagree, and the parties direct our attention to a number of cases in support of their respective positions. * * *

Having reviewed the above caselaw, it is apparent to us that the standards contained therein are fluid and best applied on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, the Bath court concluded that there is no set rule for establishing the extension of boundaries into a lake between contiguous shoreline properties and the Zappfe court applied a non-rigid reasonableness test. The Nosek apportionment method would be a perfectly appropriate way to solve the parties’ dispute, but this method has never been adopted as a fixed rule in Indiana. Indeed, as we have just concluded, there is no fixed rule governing such disputes. The trial court, therefore, erroneously concluded that the NRC’s failure to follow the Nosek rule was contrary to law. * * *

Having carefully reviewed the facts and circumstances of the case, the NRC concluded that extending the property lines lakeward was equitable and resulted in a fair apportionment. That there may have been other results that would, likewise, have been equitable does not mean that the NRC arrived at a result that was erroneous or contrary to law. Nothing in the NRC’s decision warrants second-guessing from the judicial system. * * *

It is apparent that these arguments amount to requests to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review does not permit. The NRC concluded that based on the scant evidence available to it regarding the length and width of piers in the relevant vicinity, Lukis’s pier was not unusually long or wide and did not infringe on the appellees’ access to the lake. We will not second-guess that determination. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Eberaia D. Fields v. State of Indiana

Roger L. Hale, Jr. v. State of Indiana

Jesse Lindsey, III v. State of Indiana

NFP civil opinions today (6):

Douglas W. Turner v. Bryan Douglas McCormick (NFP)

Estate of Jeffrey L. Plumer v. Chicago Vendor Supply, Inc. (NFP)

Jack Wesley, II v. Deanna Wesley (NFP)

Joellen Nagel v. Eric Nagel (NFP)

Robert F. Keck and Janet L. Russell v. Mary Ann Walker, Sunman Community Church, et al (NFP)

Indiana Farm Bureau Insurance v. Justin R. McIntire (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (13):

Lazaro Rodriguez v. State of Indiana (NFP)