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Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 7 NFP)

For publication opinions today (3):

In John Barker v. Office of the Adjutant General of the State of Indiana, an 18-page opinion, Chief Judge Baker writes:

Appellant-plaintiff John Barker appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellee–defendant Office of the Adjutant General of the State of Indiana (Adjutant General), after the Military Department rejected his request for reemployment and benefits in a civil service position. Specifically, Barker argues that his action against the Adjutant General for reinstatement and for damages was not subject to summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists whether he intended to engage in "career" or "noncareer" military service. The Adjutant General cross-appeals and argues that Barker’s action is barred by the statute of limitations. Concluding that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Adjutant General, we affirm.
In D.M. v. State of Indiana , an 8-page opinion, Judge Barnes writes:
Indiana Department of Child Services, (“IDCS”), by counsel, seeks expedited review, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14.1, of the Lake Superior Court‟s (“trial court”) modified dispositional order placing D.M., a juvenile adjudicated to be a delinquent, in an out-of-state shelter care facility against the recommendations of IDCS. We affirm. * * *

In sum, a thorough review of the record leaves us convinced that the trial court's April 21, 2009 modified dispositional order placing D.M. at Silver State against IDCS's recommendation is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we find no error.

In Rosalyn West v. Betty Wadington, et al. , a 19-page opinion, Judge Barnes writes:
Rosalynn West brought suit in Marion Superior Court against Betty Wadlington, Jeanette Larkins, and Larkins‘s employer, the City of Indianapolis, claiming defamation and invasion of privacy. The trial court granted the Defendants‘ motion to dismiss the complaint. West appeals and claims that the trial court erred in granting the Defendants‘ motion to dismiss because allowing her to proceed would not require the courts to become "excessively entangled" in church politics and doctrines. We reverse and remand. * * *

Based upon the explicit holding of Brazauskas II, we must conclude that the trial court in the present case did have subject matter jurisdiction. The Marion Superior Court has the general authority to hear matters such as West‘s claims for defamation and invasion of privacy. * * *

Wadlington‘s email, although it may have originally been intended to be viewed by Church officials, was sent to a much broader audience of eighty-nine recipients. This email clearly contains some religious accusations which cannot properly be analyzed by a civil court in a defamation suit. However, the email also contains several accusations which could be considered defamatory even in a purely secular context.

The Defendants‘ last argument is that the statements in the letter should be viewed in context, i.e. a letter to church officials about a fellow church member. In other words, the Defendants claim that even those portions of the letter that could be considered in a secular context should not be considered in a secular context because the actual context is a religious one. Although we are not wholly unsympathetic to the Defendants‘ concerns, we are unable to agree. The Defendants‘ argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow someone to shield any number of defamatory statements simply by framing them in the context of a religious dispute. We believe that a properly-instructed jury could view Wadlington‘s letter and decide whether the statements are defamatory in a secular sense.

Under these facts and circumstances, West‘s action against the Defendants should not have been dismissed. The judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

NFP civil opinions today (2):

The Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of C.D., Brezzy D. v. Randolph Co. Dept. of Child Svcs. (NFP)

The Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of R.C.; and L.M.C. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Svcs. (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (5):

Cynthia Carley v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Victor Alfonso Hernandez v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Rogelio Amaro v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jeffrey Darling v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Dantley Layne v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on June 10, 2009 12:47 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions