« Ind. Courts - “It looks like we screwed up,” said Allen Superior Court Judge John Surbeck | Main | Ind. Courts - Still more on "He was trying to put her over that railing" »
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Ind. Decisions - Supreme Court decides one today
In State of Indiana v. Steve Hernandez, a 12-page, 5-0 opinion, Justice Sullivan writes:
Steve Hernandez and the State both appeal determinations made by the trial court with respect to Hernandez’s petition for post-conviction relief regarding convictions and sentences for two murders committed in 1975. Because these crimes were committed prior to the 1977 effective date of our state’s current criminal sentencing code, resolution of the issues in this case requires the application of certain principles and terminology infrequently used today. On the most consequential of these, we hold that Indiana law in effect at the time of Hernandez’s crimes dictated that he was not eligible to be considered for parole absent executive clemency. * * *It was, of course, incorrect [in Johnson v. Dobeski] to refer to a life sentence as “indeterminate.” See Brown, 322 N.E.2d at 711 (“a life sentence is neither determinate nor indeterminate.”). And, given White and our analysis supra, it is now clear that a person serving a life sentence imposed at the time of the crime committed by the prisoner in Johnston was not eligible for consideration for parole. To the extent that Johnston held that a life sentence was indeterminate and that a prisoner serving a life sentence was eligible for consideration for parole, it is overruled.
Given that, what is the explanation for the Parole Board data showing hundreds of per-sons under life sentences receiving parole? The answer to that question is that an intermediate step had occurred – a step that was not discussed or disclosed in the meeting minutes of the Pa-role Board. Under Indiana law at the time, the Parole Board also functioned as the Indiana Cle-mency Commission. I.C. § 11-1-1-41 (1971). Prisoners not eligible for parole sought clemency, or reductions in their sentences, by filing petitions with the Clemency Commission. 1933 Ind. Acts 721, Pub. L. No. 117, § 4 (codified at I.C. § 11-7-4-2 (1971)). When the Clemency Com-mission considered such petitions to be meritorious, the Commission forwarded them to the Governor, who had the authority to grant or deny them.
In the case before us today, the State has provided us with records showing that during the period in question, the members of the Parole Board – but sitting as the Clemency Commis-sion – regularly recommended to the Governor the requests of persons under life sentences for reductions in their sentences from life to a term of years. And the Governor regularly approved the Clemency Commission’s recommendation. No longer being under a life sentence, these prisoners had become eligible for parole and the Parole Board granted it.
This intervening step of executive clemency, which was not apparent to us when we decided Johnston, does not affect our attitude about the outcome of Johnston. The reason for examining the Parole Board records in the first place was to see whether life sentences imposed at the time were done so under a “sentencing regime that expressly provided for later review” and whether the sentence to which the prisoner and county prosecutor agreed exceeded the periods of time with respect to which the “sentencing system regularly authorized parole from life sentences.” Johnston, 739 N.E.2d at 125. The fact that there was an intervening step in the sentencing regime of which we were not aware, does not change the broader conclusion that the statutes in effect at the time could have operated to provide that the prisoner’s original sentence would be modified to one equal to that provided in his agreement with the prosecutor. We therefore reaffirm our holding in Johnston that the agreement between the prisoner and the county prosecutor was valid.
Our discussion of the Johnston case has direct implications for Hernandez. Although we hold that he is not eligible to seek parole, he is eligible to seek clemency in the same manner that so many individuals successfully did during the years in question. From what we have seen in the record, he warrants consideration. Should he be successful in having his sentences commuted to a term of years, he would then be eligible to seek parole.
The decision of the post-conviction court denying in part Hernandez’s petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed and its decision granting in part is reversed. This matter is remanded to the post-conviction court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the State.
Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur. Shepard, C.J., concurs in result without separate opinion.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 30, 2009 04:47 PM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions