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Monday, August 24, 2009
Ind. Decisions - Supreme Court posts one late this afternoon
In Alvey v. State, a 7-page, 4-1 opinion, Justice Sullivan writes:
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are conflicting over whether an individual who pleads guilty to an offense is entitled to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress or other pre-trial motion on direct appeal. Precedent limiting the right to appeal following a guilty plea dictates that such an appeal is not permitted. * * *Based on the weight of the authority, Alvey cannot challenge his convictions in a direct appeal following his guilty plea. To the extent that prior opinions of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with this conclusion, we disapprove of those decisions. See, e.g., Jones, 866 N.E.2d 339; S.A., 654 N.E.2d 791. A trial court lacks the authority to allow defendants the right to ap-peal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence when a defendant enters a guilty plea, even where a plea agreement maintains that such an appeal is permitted. Lineberry, 747 N.E.2d at 1155. Therefore, despite the plea agreement’s statement to the contrary, Alvey could not plead guilty and challenge the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress. * * *
Defendants who plead guilty to achieve favorable outcomes forfeit a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights. Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ind. 2001). Alvey cannot benefit from both the advantages of pleading guilty and the right to raise allegations of error with respect to pre-trial rulings; these rights are relinquished once defendants decide against facing an uncertain outcome at trial.
Although we hold that a defendant cannot challenge the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress following a guilty plea, including those cases where the defendant reserved the right in his or her plea agreement, we find some unfairness to Alvey. Should we simply vacate the plea, he could face a higher sentence. Therefore, Alvey shall have the option of proceeding with the current plea agreement (absent the right to appeal the suppression order). If he does not exercise this option within 90 days of this opinion being certified (unless extended by the trial court), the plea agreement shall be vacated. * * *
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Rucker, JJ., concur. Boehm, J., dissents with separate opinion. [that begins] I respectfully dissent. I see no reason why this plea agreement should not be honored ac-cording to its terms, as it would in several states and in federal court under Federal Rule of Crim-inal Procedure 11(a)(2). See 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 21.6(b) (3d ed. 2007).
Posted by Marcia Oddi on August 24, 2009 04:54 PM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions