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Friday, March 12, 2010

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 6 NFP)

For publication opinions today (3):

In Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of A.B., et al.; A.B. v. IDCS, an 11-page opinion, Judge Mathias writes:

A.M.B. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her three children, A.B., J.B., and M.M. Mother raises several allegations of error, including an assertion that she was denied due process of law when she was not permitted to testify during the termination hearing. Although Mother was twenty minutes late to the termination hearing, which itself commenced more than an hour behind schedule, we believe that under the unique facts and circumstances before us, she should have been afforded the opportunity to testify. In light of the constitutional dimensions of the right to parent one’s child, we reverse and remand for at least the opportunity for Mother to be heard.
In State of Indiana v. Natasha Durrett, a 15-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:
The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of a case in which Natasha Durrett allegedly drove a van that struck someone, resulting in serious bodily injury to that person, and allegedly failed to return to the scene of the accident. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the absence of the van, the victim, and the investigating officer warrants dismissal. We find no evidence of bad faith in the State’s failure to preserve the van, no denial of Durrett’s right of confrontation due to the victim’s absence as a witness, and no evidence of bad faith in the State’s failure to provide discovery. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Durrett’s motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse. * * *

CRONE, J., concurs.
RILEY, J., dissents with separate opinion. [that begins] I respectfully dissent. The trial court determined that the cumulative effect of the missing instrumentality alleged to have been used in Durrett’s act (the van), the missing alleged victim, and the unavailability of the lead investigating officer endangered Durrett’s fundamental due process rights. I fail to see how we are in a position to determine that the trial court’s decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” which is the standard we must apply when reviewing the trial court’s dismissal. State v. Fettig, 884 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied.

In State of Indiana v. Dustin Prater, a 10-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Najam writes:
Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-4-2(3), the State appeals the trial court’s order granting Dustin Prater’s Motion to Correct Error. The State raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-14.5(c) requires an individual in possession of anhydrous ammonia have the personal “intent to manufacture methamphetamine or amphetamine” in order to commit a Class D felony under that statute. We affirm. * * *

In sum, the plain language of Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-14.5(c) requires that the person who possesses anhydrous ammonia have the intent to use that chemical in the manufacture of methamphetamine to commit a Class D felony. When a statute is unambiguous, our interpretation is controlled by the statute’s express language. Ind. Pesticide Rev. Bd., 916 N.E.2d at 181. Here, the State presented no evidence that Prater personally intended to manufacture methamphetamine. As such, we must affirm the trial court’s grant of Prater’s motion to correct error, vacating his conviction under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-14.5(c).

FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
BRADFORD, J., dissents with separate opinion. [that begins] In my view, persons who possess anhydrous ammonia for purposes of manufacturing methamphetamine, even if they intend for another individual to do the manufacturing, are covered under Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.5(c) (2007). For this reason, I respectfully dissent.

NFP civil opinions today (2):

Brian D. Horner v. Jennifer L. Horner (NFP)

Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of Y.O., D.N., and C.O.; S.N. v. IDCS (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (4):

Jason Reeves v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Roger Wilson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Edgar Burelison v. State of Indiana (NFP)

James L. Croom v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 12, 2010 10:37 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions