Friday, April 30, 2010
Ind. Decisions - Supreme Court grants three transfers today
The Clerk's transfer list should be available Monday, but meanwhile the ILB has received notice that the Supreme Court has granted transfers this week to three cases:
- James Carr v. State (25A04-0906-CR-356 / 25S04-1004-CR-219) -- this was a NFP COA opinion issued Feb. 4, 2010, where the Court held:
(1) Carr's proceedings did not violate the speedy trial provisions of Indiana Criminal Rule 4, (2) Carr's confession to law enforcement was not procured in violation of his Miranda rights, (3) the trial court did not err by prohibiting cross-examination into Carr's level of intoxication during his custodial interrogation, and (4) the court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on various lesser-included offenses.
- State of Indiana v. Craig Cooper (49A02-0907-PC-599 / 49S02-1004-PC-220) - this was a 2-1 Dec. 15, 2009 opinion where the majority wrote:
Specifically, the State argues that Cooper's request for post-conviction relief should have been denied because, even though the date and location of the offense were not specified in the factual basis during the guilty plea hearing, Cooper has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by those “irregularities.” Concluding that the post-conviction court properly granted Cooper's request for relief, we affirm.
- Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of I.B.; M.L., et al v. IDCS (03A05-0912-JV-676 / 03S05-1004-JV-218) - this was a Feb. 17, 2010 decision that concluded:
Appellant counsel’s extremely brief argument is that because the Indiana statute provides for appointment of counsel “in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship,” citing to Indiana Code section 31-32-4-3, and “one’s right to parent one’s children” has “Constitutional implications,” it is reasonable that the parent’s “right to counsel should extend to appellate review of” the judgment terminating that relationship. Other than to suggest that our standard of review is that applied when interpreting a statute, the brief provides no further citation to authority or development a cogent argument in support of the proposition presented. Accordingly, we are not persuaded. * * *
As our Supreme Court held, before the statute was amended to read as provided above, “the decision to appoint counsel for an indigent litigant in a civil case turns on the court’s assessment of the nature of the case, the genuineness of the issues, and any other factors that bear on the wisdom of mandating public funds for that purpose.” Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ind. 2001). To prevail on an argument that the trial court should have assigned counsel pursuant to the current statute, the “burden is on the party seeking to proceed as an indigent person to demonstrate that he meets the statutory requirements for the appointment of counsel.” Maust v. Estate of Bair ex rel. Bair, 859 N.E.2d 779, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Sholes, 760 N.E.2d at 160). Clearly Mother, who as the trial court noted has not even “requested” the appointment of counsel to appeal the termination order, has not carried her burden.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on April 30, 2010 12:05 PM
Posted to Indiana Transfer Lists