Friday, October 01, 2010
Ind. Decisions - Two Indiana cases and a cybersquatting case decided today by 7th Circuit
From Annex Books v. City of Indianapolis (SD Ind., Evans), a 4-page, per curiam opinion:
This suit began when the City of Indianapolis required adult bookstores to be closed all day on Sunday and between midnight and 10 a.m. on other days. We held last year that the empirical support for this ordinance was too weak to satisfy the requirement of intermediate scrutiny, which applies to such laws. * * * The City needs evidence about the effects of the sort of law it enacted. We suggested that experience in Indianapolis itself could supply the required data: Before the City’s ordinance took its current form, plaintiffs had been treated like other bookstores, so it should be possible to find out whether the new closing hours reduced crime or produced other benefits. 581 F.3d at 463.In U.S. v. Suggs (SD Ind., Hamilton), a 12-page opinion, Judge Sykes writes:
After the remand, plaintiffs asked the district court to enter a preliminary injunction. A hearing was held, at which Indianapolis offered a single piece of evidence: Richard McCleary & Alan C. Weinstein, Do “Off-Site” Adult Businesses Have Secondary Effects? Legal Doctrine, Social Theory, and Empirical Evidence, 31 L. & Policy 217 (2009). The authors concluded that dispersing adult stores that sell for off-site reading or viewing reduced crime in Sioux City, Iowa. Indianapolis contended that this article supports its ordinance too. The district judge was skeptical, and entitled to be so, for three reasons. * * *
The district judge did not abuse her discretion. The single article that Indianapolis offered suffers some of the shortcomings of the evidence we evaluated last year: it concerns a dispersal ordinance rather than an hours-ofoperation limit, and the authors did not attempt to control for other potential causes of change in the number of arrests near adult establishments. The other new evidence, derived from experience with this ordinance in Indianapolis, appears to support the plaintiffs (though a statistical analysis might show that the support is illusory). Given the state of the record, the district court’s decision is sound. The parties should devote their energies to compiling information from which a reliable final decision may be made after a trial on the merits. AFFIRMED
Police officers arrested Charles Suggs after a traffic stop during which he pulled a handgun from beneath the driver’s seat of his truck. Suggs later pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment. On appeal Suggs challenges the district court’s application at sentencing of a 4-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) for using or possessing the firearm in connection with another felony offense. We affirm.In a case out of Illinois, Mobile Anesthesiologists v. Anesthesia Associates, Judge Hamilton writes:
We refer to the parties as Mobile/Chicago and Mobile/Houston. Mobile/Chicago brought suit against Mobile/Houston in federal court in Illinois claiming that Mobile/Houston violated the federal anti-cybersquatting statute by registering a domain name confusingly similar to Mobile/Chicago’s registered trademark. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.
We affirm. First, we conclude that Mobile/Houston did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense by asking to delay a preliminary injunction hearing or by asking for expedited discovery to prepare for that hearing. Second, we agree with the district court that Mobile/ Houston lacked the required “minimum contacts” with Illinois to support personal jurisdiction there. Mobile/ Chicago relies principally on the inference that Mobile/ Houston expressly aimed its conduct in Texas at harming Mobile/Chicago in Illinois. That inference is based on two inadequate connections between Mobile/ Houston and Illinois: (1) Mobile/Houston’s creation of a website accessible in Illinois but aimed only at the Houston market, combined with Mobile/Houston’s constructive notice of Mobile/Chicago’s trademark via federal registration of that mark; and (2) Mobile/Houston’s receipt of Mobile/Chicago’s cease-and-desist letter. These contacts are not sufficient to establish that Mobile/Houston’s activities in Texas were calculated to cause harm in Illinois.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on October 1, 2010 12:44 PM
Posted to Ind. (7th Cir.) Decisions