Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 6 today (and 7 NFP)
For publication opinions today (6):
In George F. Evans, Jr. v. Peggy A. Evans, a 15-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Brown writes:
George F. Evans, Jr. appeals the trial court's order granting a motion to compel payment in favor of James C. Michael, as personal representative of the estate of Peggy A. Evans, pursuant to an amended dissolution decree. George raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Michael's motion to compel payment after amending the dissolution decree pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). We affirm. * * *In Trust of William H. Riddle; Linda Goins v. Patricia Riddle, a 17-page opinion, Judge Riley concludes:
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of Michael's motion to compel payment. Affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., concurs.
RILEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. [that begins] While I agree with the majority's treatment of the trial court's characterization of Michael's motion to compel as a motion within the confines of Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8), I respectfully disagree with its analysis of the trial court's alternate payment plan.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that Goins had breached her duties as trustee of the Trust. With respect to the cross-appeal, we remand to the trial court for the determination of reasonable trial and appellate attorney fees.In Estate of Nathaniel Kappel v. Margaret Kappel, a 6-page opinion, Judge Bailey writes:
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings as stated in our opinion and the remaining proceedings contemplated in the trial court's Order on Trustee's Report.
The Estate of Nathaniel Kappel appeals an order of the Hendricks Superior Court, Probate Division, requiring the Estate to pay a survivor's allowance to Nathaniel Kappel's widow, Margaret Kappel. The Estate presents the sole issue of whether the demand for payment is an untimely claim against the Estate. We affirm. * * *In Jerry and Mary Kwolek v. Rodney and Jennifer Swickard, a 20-page opinion, Judge Najam concludes:
Here, the Estate's argument that a timely claim filing is required is likewise unavailing. If a surviving spouse need not file a demand for payment of the survivor's allowance at all, the spouse need not do so within the nine-month period of time prescribed by Indiana Code Section 29-1-14-1(d). As such, the probate court properly granted Margaret her statutory right to a survivor's allowance.
In sum, we hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the easement grants to the Swickards the right to park within the easement. To the contrary, the easement is expressly limited by its terms to ingress and egress, and, absent a cogent prescriptive claim, evidence of use cannot be used to expand the scope of the easement beyond its explicit terms. We also hold that the court's order for the Kwoleks to remove their improvements from the easement is clearly erroneous in that the improvements do not interfere with the Swickards' ingress and egress. Finally, we hold that the doctrine of acquiescence does not apply here and, therefore, does not bar the Kwoleks from raising their claims. Thus, the trial court's judgment for the Swickards is clearly erroneous, and it must be reversed.In Sheila K. Granger v. State of Indiana , a 20-page opinion, Judge Bailey concludes:
While the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of some, but not all evidence seized from Granger's home, the admission of that evidence was harmless error. Granger's sixty year executed sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of her offenses and her character, and we reduce her aggregate sentence to fifty years with ten years suspended.In Tywan D. Griffin v. State of Indiana, a 6-page opinion, Judge Riley concludes:
Instead, these facts are evidence of Griffin’s knowledge of the marijuana blunt and his intent to maintain dominion and control over it. When we interpret this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, it is sufficient to support an inference that Griffin constructively possessed marijuana.NFP civil opinions today (4):
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State produced sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Griffin committed the charge of possession of marijuana.
NFP criminal opinions today (3):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 30, 2011 10:40 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions