Friday, May 06, 2011
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 12 NFP) [Corrected]
For publication opinions today (3):
In John Witt, Hydrotech Corp. and Mark Shere v. Jay Petroleum, Inc. and Jack R. James, a 33-page opinion, Judge Bailey writes:
The parties present numerous issues for our review. In conformance with our opinion in this matter, we reframe the issues in this appeal, which are: I. Whether the trial court erred when it issued the TRO, and whether we may review that decision; and II. Whether the trial court erred when it found the Appellants were in contempt of court. * * *In R.L. Turner Corporation v. Town of Brownsburg, a 23-page opinion, Judge Crone writes extensively on attorney's fees' awards, concluding:
The trial court’s contempt order and the sanctions assessed against the Appellants were punitive in nature, not coercive. Such use of a contempt order is outside the bounds of what is permissible for civil indirect contempt.
Conclusion. The trial court erred when it held the Appellants in contempt of court, both because the TRO was improvidently granted and because the Appellants’ conduct on June 27, 2008, did not constitute a willful violation of the terms of the order. Moreover, even if the Appellants had willfully violated the TRO’s terms, holding the Appellants in contempt nearly eighteen months after the TRO was entered and rendered moot by a subsequent preliminary injunction served no coercive purpose, but was instead a punitive measure impermissible in an indirect civil contempt proceeding. Reversed.
In sum, we hold that the term “costs” may include attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Code Sections 34-52-1-1(b) and 34-13-3-21. We further hold that the trial court's original judgment providing for “costs to be assessed” against Turner included an award of attorney's fees and expenses to be effectuated at a later date. Assuming arguendo that the original judgment did not include an award of fees, the trial court here had authority to enter a post-judgment award of attorney's fees to the Town. Hereafter, post-judgment requests for attorney's fees by a prevailing party in a frivolous lawsuit may be filed no later than sixty-days after final judgment has been rendered. Finally, we hold that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Turner's lawsuit against the Town was frivolous, unreasonable and/or groundless. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding $27,410.67 in attorney's fees and expenses to the Town. [Emphasis by ILB]In Gayle D. Edelen v. State of Indiana , a 16-page opinion, Judge Najam writes:
Gayle D. Edelen appeals her convictions for perjury and official misconduct, each a Class D felony, following a jury trial. Edelen raises two issues for our review: 1. Whether the transcript of the closed juvenile proceeding in which Edelen perjured herself is confidential and therefore inadmissible during her perjury trial; and 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her convictions.NFP civil opinions today (4):
We hold that the transcript is not confidential because it involves an adult charged with a crime. We also hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Edelen's convictions. As such, we affirm.
Jamie L. Vida v. State of Indiana (NFP) - This is the correction, it is a NFP civil opinion re the sex offender registry. Judge Crone writes:
Jamie L. Vida appeals from the denial of his verified petition for removal from the Indiana Sex Offender Registry (“the Registry”). Vida asserts, and the State properly concedes, that the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (“the Act”) as applied to him violates the ex post facto clause of the Indiana Constitution because he committed the sex offenses at issue before the Act became effective. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant Vida's petition.ILB: See also the Jan. 6, 2010 Supreme Court opinion in Hevner v. State.
NFP criminal opinions today (8):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on May 6, 2011 10:46 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions