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Wednesday, August 17, 2011

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 4 today (and 10 NFP)

For publication opinions today (4):

In Amy Gulbranson v. State of Indiana , a 6-page opinion, Judge Bradford concludes:

Gulbranson claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for Class C felony assisting a criminal because the State failed to prove that either Smallwood or Kindred has been convicted of committing a Class A felony. In support, Gulbranson relies on the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinions in McCarty v. State, 44 Ind. 214 (1873) and McKnight v. State, 658 N.E.2d 559 (1995), as well as this court’s conclusion in Myers v. State, 765 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Gulbranson’s claim, however, is misplaced because the current version of Indiana Code section 35-44-3-2, which was in effect at the time Gulbranson assisted Smallwood and Kindred, no longer requires the State to prove that the assisted person has been prosecuted for and convicted of a Class A felony.2 See Indiana Code § 35-44-3-2(b) (providing that it is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person assisted: (1) has not been prosecuted for the offense; or (2) has not been convicted of the offense). As such, Gulbranson’s reliance on authority interpreting prior versions of Indiana Code section 35-44-3-2 is misplaced, and Gulbranson’s claim is this regard must fail.
In C.S. v. State of Indiana , a 5-page opinion, Judge Kirsch writes:
C.S. appeals his juvenile adjudication as a delinquent child for violating the compulsory school attendance law (“attendance law”), a status offense, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication. We reverse. * * *

The evidence in the record before us shows that, during the fall of 2010, C.S. without excuse was absent for one full school day, missed at least part of five additional class periods, and was tardy twelve times. C.S.’s mother was cooperative with the school when told about his attendance issues and took disciplinary actions at home. Thereafter, C.S. was no longer absent or tardy. Without more, we find that there is insufficient evidence that C.S. is in need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation, a required element in order to be adjudicated as a delinquent in violation of the attendance law. Therefore, we conclude that insufficient evidence was presented to support C.S.’s adjudication as a delinquent child. Reversed.

In Randall Thomas Ford v. Debra Ann Ford , a 13-page opinion, Judge Mathias writes:
Randall Thomas Ford (“Randall”) challenges the Brown Circuit Court's order determining that funds in Randall's employer-funded health benefit account constitute a marital asset subject to equal division in the marital dissolution action filed by Debra Ann Ford (“Debra”). On appeal, Randall claims that his interest in the employer-funded account was not vested and was therefore not subject to division as a marital asset. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the benefit plan constitutes a marital asset subject to division, but we reverse the trial court's judgment regarding valuation of the account.
In Outboard Boating Club of Evansville, Inc. v. Indiana State Dept. of Health , a 12-page opinion, Judge Mathias writes:
Outboard Boating Club of Evansville (“Outboard”) and Small-Craft Boaters, Inc. (“Small-Craft”) (collectively, “the Clubs”) filed an action for declaratory judgment in Vanderburgh Circuit Court against the Indiana State Department of Health (“the ISDH”). The trial court subsequently granted the ISDH’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clubs appeal and argue that the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction. Concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the Clubs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we affirm. * * *

Here, the Clubs argue that they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their declaratory judgment action because they are challenging the ISDH’s jurisdiction to regulate their facilities. In advancing their argument, the Clubs rely solely on our supreme court’s decision in Twin Eagle. * * *

Here, unlike in Twin Eagle, there is no abstract question of law presented regarding the ISDH’s general authority to regulate Indiana campgrounds. Rather, the Clubs argue that the particular facilities at issue are not subject to the ISDH’s regulatory jurisdiction over campgrounds. This question of jurisdiction over a particular site is precisely the the type of fact sensitive issue the Twin Eagle court concluded should be resolved in the first instance by the administrative agency.

NFP civil opinions today (6):

Tat-Yik Jarvis Ka and Amanda Beth Ka v. City of Indianapolis (NFP)

David G. Carmichael v. Candace (Carmichael) Ballard (NFP)

N.D. v. T.D. (NFP)

Beverly Jinkins v. Jet Credit Union (NFP)

Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of: S.C., et al.; D.C. v. I.D.C.S. (NFP)

Frontier Insurance Co. and Midwest Bonding, Inc. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (4):

Joshua Farmer v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Thomas Hopkins v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Kevin R. Franklin v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Base Alston-Butler v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on August 17, 2011 11:46 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions