Thursday, September 15, 2011
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 4 today (and 15 NFP)
For publication opinions today (4):
In Board of Works of the City of Lake Station, Indiana, et al. v. I.A.E., Inc., Consulting Engineers, a 16-page opinion, Judge Darden writes:
The Board of Works of the City of Lake Station, Indiana, and the City of Lake Station (collectively, “Lake Station”) appeal the jury's verdict and the trial court's rulings in favor of I.A.E. Consulting Engineers, Inc. (“I.A.E.”). We affirm but remand for further proceedings. * * *In City of Jeffersonville, Indiana and City of Jeffersonville Sanitary Sewer Board v. Environmental Management Corporation , a 30-page opinion, Judge Riley writes:
Although Lake Station does not question the computation of prejudgment interest, we raise the issue sua sponte as part of our duty to conserve public funds. When there is no contractual agreement for the payment of interest, such as in this case, interest on a damage award “should not be compounded but calculated as simple interest.” [cites omitted] Accordingly, we remand with instructions that the trial court recalculate the prejudgment interest award, using simple interest from the date of I.A.E.'s demand.
Appellants-Defendants, the City of Jeffersonville (Jeffersonville), and the City of Jeffersonville Sanitary Sewer Board (Sewer Board) (collectively, the City), appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee-Plaintiff, Environmental Management Corporation (EMC), with respect to EMC’s claims that (1) the City breached its contract with EMC, (2) violated Indiana’s Open Door Law, and (3) acted in contempt of an agreed entry and order. * * *In Frederick R. Lucas v. Darrin McDonald, a 7-page opinion, Chief Judge Robb writes:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that (1) the trial court did not err in finding that the City breached its contract with EMC; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding documentary evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding that the City violated Indiana’s Open Door Law, as EMC waived its claim by failing to file a timely complaint; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the City in contempt of the Agreed Entry; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding EMC attorney’s fees to compensate it for all fees incurred after its first Open Door Complaint; (6) the trial court erred in awarding EMC costs that included compensation for expenses other than litigation expenses; and (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing EMC’s corporate support expenses from its losses during its calculation of EMC’s damages. We reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the City’s Open Door violation, its award of attorney’s fees, and its award of costs to EMC. We remand to the trial court with instructions that the trial court modify its award of attorney’s fees and costs to EMC to include only the amount of attorney’s fees EMC incurred as a result of its contempt complaint and costs reflecting EMC’s losses for filing fees and statutory witness fees. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Frederick Lucas appeals the trial court’s denial of his Verified Petition for Relief from his lifetime sex offender registration requirement. He presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. * * *In National Wine & Spirits, Inc., National Wine & Spirits Corporation, NWS Michigan, Inc., and NWS, LLC v. Ernst & Young, LLP, an 11page opinion, Chief Judge Robb writes:
Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22(g) expressly provides the trial court “has the discretion to deny a petition under this section, even if the court makes the findings under [subsection (g)].” Lucas repeatedly rests his argument on the fact that he is eligible for relief under the relevant statute because he proved the requisite findings, along with the facts that he has no other criminal record, has complied with registration requirements, and has not bothered the victim since his offense. For us to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion because Lucas meets all the required findings for relief would be to ignore subsection (g)’s express discretionary language that applies even when a petitioner has shown all necessary findings.
National Wine and Spirits (“NWS”) appeals the trial court's grant of Ernst & Young's (“E&Y”) second motion for summary judgment. NWS raises one issue, which we expand and restate as three: whether E&Y's second summary judgment motion was improper; whether the trial court erred in granting E&Y's second motion for summary judgment; and, alternatively, whether res judicata bars NWS's deception claim. Concluding the successive motion was proper, but that there are genuine issues of material fact and res judicata does not bar NWS's claim, we reverse and remand.
NFP civil opinions today (8):
NFP criminal opinions today (7):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on September 15, 2011 12:42 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions