Friday, October 28, 2011
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 7 NFP)
For publication opinions today (3):
In Rick Gillespie, Dawn Gillespie and Rick's Towing and Maintenance, LLC v. Frank B. Niles and Kathryn Niles, a 15-page opinion, Judge Barnes writes:
The Defendants raise several issues, which we consolidate and restate as: I. whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Defendants‟ objection to the Nileses‟ request for a pre-trial conference and refusing to dismiss the action under Indiana Trial Rule 41(E); and II. whether the trial court properly granted the Nileses‟ cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment. * * *In R.R.F. v. L.L.F. , a 14-page opinion, Judge Mathias writes:
Absolutely no evidence was designated here that the Gillespies had ignored, controlled, or manipulated the corporate form or that their actions were fraud or promoted injustice. The Nileses cite only evidence that the Gillespies were responsible for sending the notice, publishing the advertisement, and conducting the sale and that their friend, Jon Trusty, purchased the vehicle. These actions, however, were performed as employees of Rick‟s Towing and do not demonstrate a basis for piercing the corporate veil. Further, the Nileses cite no authority for the proposition that a friend of the Gillespies could not purchase the vehicle at the auction. In fact, the Gillespies themselves could have purchased the vehicle. I.C. § 9-22-5-15(g) (“A person who holds a mechanic‟s lien under this section may purchase a vehicle subject to sale under this section.”). We conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against the Gillespies individually.
Conclusion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Defendants‟ objection to the Nileses‟ request for a pre-trial conference and refusing to dismiss the action under Indiana Trial Rule 41(E). Further, the trial court properly denied the Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the Nileses. However, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against the Gillespies individually. Rather, the judgment should be against Rick‟s Towing only. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
R.R.F. (“Father”) appeals from the dissolution court’s order on remand apportioning post-secondary educational expenses for the parties’ son, E.F., between Father and L.L.F. (“Mother”). On appeal, Father argues that the dissolution court’s order was clearly erroneous in light of certain tax credits available to Mother as a result of E.F.’s enrollment in college. The State, which became a party to this action through the intervention of the Title IV-D Prosecutor, cross-appeals and asserts that the order on remand is not an appealable final judgment, and that we must therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Concluding that this court has subject matter jurisdiction because the order on remand is an appealable final judgment and that the dissolution court’s allocation of the benefits of the tax credits was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.In M.L. v. Meridian Services, Inc., an 11-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:
M.L. threatened suicide and drank rubbing alcohol and was admitted to a hospital emergency room. Meridian Services, Inc. (“Meridian”), petitioned to have M.L. involuntarily committed to a state-operated facility for a ninety-day period because he suffered from depression and alcoholism and was dangerous and gravely disabled. The trial court granted the petition and authorized the state-operated facility to administer medications to M.L.NFP civil opinions today (3):
M.L. appeals, arguing that the trial court’s order is not supported by clear and convincing evidence that he is dangerous and gravely disabled and that the medications will substantially benefit him and the probable benefits outweigh any risk of harm. We conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that M.L. is dangerous. However, we agree with M.L. that the evidence is insufficient to support the authorization to administer medication. Accordingly, we affirm M.L.’s temporary commitment and reverse the authorization to treat.
NFP criminal opinions today (4):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on October 28, 2011 01:38 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions