Friday, January 20, 2012
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 10 NFP)
For publication opinions today (3):
In Apex 1 Processing, Inc. v. Akeala Edwards, on Behalf of Herself and Others Similarly Situated, a 7-page opinion, Judge May writes:
Apex 1 Processing, a “payday loan” business, includes in its loan contracts a compulsory arbitration provision. Akeala Edwards brought a class action alleging Apex, doing business as payday lender Paycheck Today, engaged in unfair trade practices. Apex moved to compel arbitration of Edwards’ claim, but the trial court denied the motion because the arbitrator designated in the contract was no longer permitted to perform such arbitrations. As the designation of the arbitrator was integral to the arbitration provision, the trial court correctly determined that the agreement was impossible to perform and thus void. We accordingly affirm.In K.F. v. State of Indiana, a 24-page opinion, Judge Darden writes:
K.F. appeals her adjudication as a delinquent child for having committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute burglary as a class B felony; theft as a class D felony; and carrying a handgun without a license, a class A misdemeanor. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.In Jose Castillo-Aguilar v. State of Indiana , a 7-page opinion, Judge May writes:
ISSUES: 1. Whether sufficient evidence supports K.F.’s true findings for burglary, theft, and carrying a handgun without a license. 2. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting certain testimony into evidence. * * *
CONCLUSION: Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that K.F. committed acts that would constitute burglary and theft if committed by an adult. However, there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that K.F. committed an act that would constitute carrying a handgun without a license. Additionally, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence K.F.’s statement made to Mother. The juvenile court did, however, err by allowing a police officer to testify as to Mother’s hearsay statements, but the admission of such testimony was harmless error. Finally, we remand with instructions for the juvenile court to correct the February 23, 2011 disposition order and CCS entry to accurately reflect the true findings that were entered by the court.
Jose Castillo-Aguilar was charged with Class C felony forgery for providing a false name to obtain employment. Police obtained the name of Castillo-Aguilar’s employer from an “Information Sheet,” (State’s Ex. 1), he was given at the Goshen Police Department following his arrest for driving without a license. Castillo-Aguilar alleges he should have received a Miranda warning prior to filling out that Information Sheet and, therefore, all evidence collected based on his answers should be suppressed. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, and we accepted jurisdiction over Castillo-Aguilar’s interlocutory appeal. We reverse. * * *NFP civil opinions today (3):
As Castillo-Aguilar was subjected to interrogation by the questions on the Information Sheet, he should have been given Miranda warnings. As he was not, the answers he provided on the Information Sheet, and evidence collected as a result of those answers, should be suppressed. See, e.g., King v. State, 844 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Because King was subjected to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warning, the pre-Miranda statements are inadmissible and should be suppressed.”). Castillo-Aguilar has demonstrated prima facie error, and we accordingly reverse the denial of his motion to suppress.
NFP criminal opinions today (7):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on January 20, 2012 12:40 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions