« Ind. Law - Ind. Tech's new law school building location announced | Main | Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 4 NFP) »
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Ind. Decisions - One today from the Supreme Court
In Antoine Hill v. State of Indiana, a 17-page, 4-1 opinion, Justice David writes:
The present case involves several petitions under Indiana’s Post-Conviction Rules. Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1 permits, among other things, a defendant to file a petition challenging the performance of his trial, appellate, or post-conviction counsel. Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2 permits, among other things, a defendant to petition the trial court for permission to pursue a belated direct appeal.Here, the defendant’s counsel filed a Post-Conviction Rule 2 petition, seeking permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied permission, and counsel did not timely appeal this denial. Subsequently, defendant, through different counsel, filed a Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition, alleging that his Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel was ineffective for failing to timely appeal the trial court’s denial of permission to file a belated notice of appeal.
We hold that the appropriate standard for judging the performance of Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel is the standard set forth in Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. 1989). We further hold that Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel in this case did not violate Baum because she represented the defendant in a procedurally fair setting which resulted in a judgment of the court. * * *
Conclusion. We conclude that the Baum standard, and not the Strickland standard, is appropriate for evaluating the performance of P-C.R. 2 counsel. Because P-C.R. 2 counsel Reed did not deprive Hill of a procedurally fair setting, Reed did not violate Baum. On that basis, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying Hill’s P-C.R. 1 petition.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, J., concur.
Sullivan, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
[Justice Sullivan's concurring opinion begins, at p. 4] I write separately because I believe that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), articulates the correct standard for measuring whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of constitutional law when counsel failed to appeal the denial of Hill’s request to file a belated direct appeal.
[Justice Rucker's one-paragraph dissent on p. 17 concludes] But at the end of the day all Hill seeks is appellate review of his fifty-two year sentence, something he has thus far been denied. Our rules should not be applied so rigorously or our case law dissected so finely as to deny a defendant in Hill’s position the opportunity to make his best effort in challenging the sentence imposed. As this Court has observed, “‘[a]lthough our procedural rules are extremely important, it must be kept in mind that they are merely a means for achieving the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice. We must examine our technical rules closely when it appears that invoking them would defeat justice; otherwise we become slaves to the technicalities themselves and they acquire the position of being the ends instead of the means.’” Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Am. States Ins. Co. v. State, 283 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ind. 1972)). Applying this principle to the case before us, I join my colleagues on the Court of Appeals and conclude that Hill should be allowed to appeal the denial of his petition to file a belated direct appeal. Therefore I respectfully dissent.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on January 24, 2012 10:49 AM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions