Thursday, March 08, 2012
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 4 today (and 10 NFP)
For publication opinions today (4):
In Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of K.E., and T.E. and J.E., T.E. and J.E. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services , a 5-page opinion, Judge Kirsch writes:
T.E. (“Mother”) and J.E. (“Father”) appeal the involuntary termination of their respective parental rights to their child, K.E., contending, inter alia, that the trial court’s judgment terminating their respective parental rights must be reversed because the Indiana Department of Child Services failed to satisfy the statutory mandates of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A). We reverse and remand.In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union No. 2371, Official Bargaining Agent, et al. v. Merchandising Equipment Group, Div. of MEG Manufacturing Corp., et al. , a 12-page opinion, Judge Vaidik writes:
In 2011, the trial court granted the defendants’ Trial Rule 41(E) motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute after the case had been pending for eighteen years, the court failed to rule on the summary judgment motions for fourteen years, and the plaintiffs took no action to push the case to resolution for a decade. The plaintiffs now appeal the dismissal. Given the extensive and unprecedented delay in this case and the plaintiffs’ lack of excuse for the delay, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case for failure to prosecute. * * *In Gladys E. Curry and Thomas Curry v. D.A.L.L. Anointed, Inc. , a 7-page opinion, the question is whether the trial court properly dismissed palintiff's complaint for injuries and loss of consortium. Judge Kirsch's opinion affirms the trial court's dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the exclusivity provision of the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act.
We recognize that dismissals are generally disfavored and do not condone the special judge’s failure to rule on the summary-judgment motions for fourteen years. Nevertheless, the burden of moving the litigation is upon the plaintiff, not the court. Given the Union’s decade-long delay and lack of excuse for the delay, we conclude that this case is one of those limited circumstances where dismissal is warranted. We therefore affirm the trial court.
In Pamela J. Hensley v. State of Indiana, a 12-page opinion, Judge Kirsch writes:
Pamela J. Hensley (―Hensley‖) brings this discretionary interlocutory appeal from the trial court‘s denial of her motion to suppress. She raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the search of Hensley‘s home violated her right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We reverse and remand.NFP civil opinions today (3):
NFP criminal opinions today (7):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 8, 2012 10:58 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions