Friday, August 03, 2012
Ind. Decisions - 7th Circuit decides two Indiana cases today
In Daryl Scruggs v. Carrier Corp. (SD Ind., Barker), a 13-page opinion, Circuit Judge Kanne writes:
In 2006, Carrier Corporation set out to remedy an excessive employee absenteeism problem which had developed at its Indianapolis manufacturing plant. As part of its plan, Carrier hired a private investigator to follow approximately thirty-five employees who were suspected of abusing the company’s leave policies. One of these employees was Daryl Scruggs, who was authorized to take intermittent leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., to care for his mother in a nursing home. After surveillance revealed that Scruggs never left his home on a day he requested FMLA leave, Carrier suspended Scruggs pending further investigation. Scruggs submitted several documents to demonstrate that he picked up his mother from the nursing home on that day and took her to a doctor’s appointment, but Carrier believed the documents were suspicious and inconsistent. Accordingly, Carrier terminated Scruggs for misusing his FMLA leave. Because we find that Carrier had an “honest suspicion” that Scruggs misused his FMLA leave, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Carrier.In BKCAP, LLC, GRAYCAP, LLC, and SWCAP, LLC v. CAPTEC Franchise Trust (ND Ind., Cosbey), an 11-page opinion, Circuit Judge Tinder writes:
Quality Dining, Inc. owns dozens of restaurants in several states, including Michigan, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. To refinance its debt, Quality Dining created subsidiaries (the plaintiffs-appellants or “Borrowers”) and made a deal with Captec Financial and GE Capital for 34 separate loans totaling $49 million, with each loan secured by a restaurant. Captec Financial assigned 13 of its loans to Captec Franchise Trust 2000-1 (the defendant-appellee or “Lender”). The parties disagree about the prepayment requirements for 12 of those loans. This is the second time we have seen this dispute, but the basic issue in this appeal is the same as it was in the first: According to the loan agreements, what is the prepayment penalty? In the first appeal, the ambiguity of the prepayment provision made answering that question impossible. In this appeal, we have the benefit of a full trial on the merits. * * * AFFIRMED.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on August 3, 2012 02:03 PM
Posted to Ind. (7th Cir.) Decisions