Tuesday, January 22, 2013
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 today (and 7 NFP)
For publication opinions today (2):
In Lula L. Jenkins, et al. v. South Bend Community School Corp. , a 9-page opinion, Judge Kirsch writes:
Lula L. Jenkins (“Jenkins”), American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 62, and AFL-CIO Local 686 (collectively “the Union”) appeal from the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of South Bend Community School Corporation (“SBCSC”) in Jenkins and the Union’s action seeking an independent determination of whether Jenkins was discharged for just cause from her position with SBCSC. On appeal, we are asked to decide if the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of SBCSC instead of making an independent determination of whether Jenkins was discharged for just cause. We reverse and remand. * * *In Erving Sanders v. State of Indiana, a 12-page opinion, Judge Brown writes:
In this case, we conclude that the “exclusive remedy” provision of the CBA at issue here was intended to function only as an exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies provision and not as a bar to Jenkins’s exercise of her right to free and open courts and their remedies. Thus, under this CBA Jenkins must proceed through the grievance procedure prior to resorting to judicial review of her claims. The advisory nature of the arbitrator’s award allows the non-prevailing party, here SBCSC, to reject the award, thus triggering judicial review, either under the UAA’s provisions or for a determination whether the facts found by the arbitrator support the award. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred by declining to make that determination and by entering summary judgment in favor of SBCSC. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of whether the facts found by the arbitrator constitute just cause under the CBA.
Sanders raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We reverse. * * *NFP civil opinions today (4):
Based upon the evidence presented at the suppression hearings, including the photographs of the Suburban which were taken one hour after the stop and depict the window tinting, we cannot say that there was an objectively justifiable reason for the stop of the vehicle. Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances Officer Minch lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Sanders for investigatory purposes at the time he observed Sanders’s vehicle. The trial court erred in denying Sanders’s motion to suppress.
NFP criminal opinions today (3):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on January 22, 2013 12:07 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions