Monday, April 01, 2013
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 today (and 10 NFP)
For publication opinions today (2):
Roche Diagnostics Operations, Inc. v. Marsh Supermarkets, LLC, is a 39-page, 2-1 opinion by Judge Riley in a dispute involving an 18-year sublease between Marsh and Roche and Roche's termination thereof. The opinion concludes:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that (1) the trial court properly denied Roche’s cross-motion for summary judgment; (2) that the trial court properly granted Judgment in favor of Marsh; and (3) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Marsh damages. Affirmed.In Michael L. Curtis v. State of Indiana , a 5-page opinion, Judge Sharpnack writes:
BAILEY, J. concurs
CRONE, J. dissents with separate [1-page] opinion [that begins]: I respectfully dissent. I believe that the trial court should have granted Roche’s summary judgment motion because the Sublease and Extension Letters are unambiguous and authorize Roche to terminate the Sublease at the time and in the manner that it did.
Following our opinion in Curtis v. State, 981 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), which reversed the trial court’s denial of Michael Curtis’s motion for relief from judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the order authorizing forfeiture of his truck, the State petitions for rehearing. We grant rehearing to address the State’s argument but still conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Curtis’s motion. * * *NFP civil opinions today (5):
We acknowledge the Indiana Supreme Court’s statements that the owner of a vehicle need not be charged or convicted on the underlying offense for forfeiture to occur. See Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ind. 2011); Katner, 655 N.E.2d at 348. Indeed, a person’s vehicle may be forfeited even if it was another person who used the vehicle to transport stolen property, so long as the owner of the vehicle knew or had reason to know that the vehicle was being used in that illicit manner. Nevertheless, we find that where the underlying offense actually charged is, as here, fraud (knowingly or intentionally selling a recording for commercial gain or personal financial gain that does not conspicuously display the true name and address of the manufacturer of the recording) and not theft (knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control over another person’s property with intent to deprive that person of any part of its value or use) or conversion (knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control over another person’s property), there is no predicate for forfeiture. We therefore affirm our original disposition.
NFP criminal opinions today (5):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on April 1, 2013 12:41 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions