Wednesday, April 24, 2013
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 6 NFP)
For publication opinions today (3):
In State of Indiana v. Darrell Keck, an 8-page opinion, Judge May writes:
Darrell Keck was stopped after police saw him driving on the left side of a county road. He was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated1 and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .08 or more,2 both Class C misdemeanors. Keck moved to suppress evidence arising out of the stop, arguing police should not have stopped him because road conditions were so bad he could not safely drive on the right side of the road. In granting Keck’s motion to suppress, the trial court determined “driving left-of-center has become a necessity” because of poor road conditions in the county, and police therefore did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Keck. The State appeals, arguing the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Keck because he was driving left of center. We affirm.In Joshua McCaine Pillow v. State of Indiana , a 4-page opinion, Judge May writes:
Joshua McCaine Pillow appeals his conviction after a bench trial of Class C felony operating a motor vehicle after his driving privileges had been forfeited for life. Pillow argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him. We affirm. * * *In Ryan Shelby v. State of Indiana , a 42-page opinion, Judge Mathias concludes:
There was sufficient evidence Pillow operated a motor vehicle and his driving privileges had been forfeited for life, which is all the State is obliged to prove under section 9-30-10-17. Brock, 955 N.E.2d at 205. We accordingly affirm.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shelby’s motion to view the crime scene, nor did the trial court’s denial of Shelby’s motion to certify its order for interlocutory appeal constitute reversible error.NFP civil opinions today (3):
As to alleged cumulative error, there was no Brady violation. The manner in which the police chose to investigate the crime does not constitute legal error on appeal. The presentation of inconsistent testimony is a factual issue for the trier of fact to resolve. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct. Thus, since none of Shelby’s claims of error were in fact error, there was no cumulative effect of these alleged errors requiring reversal.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Shelby’s statements to the police. And to the extent that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of Shelby’s expert witness, the error was harmless in light of the testimony that was presented by the witness.
Lastly, even if the trial court did abuse its discretion in failing to consider Shelby’s proffered mitigator of “residual doubt,” we would not remand for resentencing because Shelby’s advisory sentence of fifty-five years for the brutal murder of his stepdaughter is not inappropriate. Affirmed.
NFP criminal opinions today (3):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on April 24, 2013 11:12 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions