Thursday, October 24, 2013
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 1 NFP)
For publication opinions today (3):
In In Re the Marriage of Leora McGee v. Robert McGee, a 6-page opinion, Judge Mathias writes:
Leora McGee (“Wife”) appeals the Lake Superior Court’s grant of the petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the co-guardians of Robert McGee (“Husband”) on Husband’s behalf. Wife presents several issues on appeal, but we address a single dispositive issue, namely, whether the trial court erred in granting the petition where Indiana statute provides no authorization for a guardian to file a petition for dissolutionIn Patricia Terkosky v. Indiana Department of Education, a 41-page opinion, Judge Brown writes:
on behalf of his or her ward. We reverse. * * *
The right to dissolve a marriage is not a common law right; rather it is a purely statutory right. Therefore, a petition to dissolve a marriage can only be brought in the manner and within the limitations prescribed by statute. * * *
While the statutes governing dissolution and guardianship in Indiana have evolved since 1951, when Quear was decided, it is still the case today that neither the current Indiana statutes governing dissolution of marriage nor those governing the guardianship of incapacitated persons provide a means for a guardian to file a petition for dissolution of marriage on behalf of his or her ward. * * *
Therefore, since Indiana statute does not provide guardians with the authority to petition for dissolution of marriage on the ward’s behalf, the trial court’s grant of the petition for dissolution Hilton and Kalajian filed on Husband’s behalf was improper.
Conclusion. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the petition for dissolution filed by co-guardians Hilton and Kalajian on behalf of their ward, Husband.
Patricia Terkosky appeals from the trial court’s order affirming the decision of the Indiana Department of Education (the “IDOE”) to suspend her teaching license for two years. She raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the court erred in denying her petition for judicial review. We affirm. * * *In Gregory Dickens v. State of Indiana, an 18-page opinion, Judge Bradford writes:
Conclusion. In addition to disciplining M.F. by making her ride the second bus, Terkosky’s acts all involved becoming physical with her students. Such acts, especially when viewed together, were found to have offended generally accepted standards of conduct of teachers and accordingly constituted misconduct in office. We find that substantial evidence was present to support the ALJ’s findings, and the ALJ’s conclusion that a two-year suspension was warranted was not contrary to law. Accordingly we conclude that the trial court did not err in affirming the ALJ’s Order.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Terkosky’s petition for judicial review and affirming the decision of the IDOE to suspend Terkosky’s teaching license for two years.
Appellant-Petitioner Gregory Dickens was convicted of murdering a police officer while the officer was engaged in his official duties. Dickens’s conviction was affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court on direct appeal. Dickens sought post-conviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that he was entitled to a new trial in light of newly discovered evidence, that he was entitled to a new trial because the State withheld evidence from the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Dickens now appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Concluding that Dickens was not entitled to a new trial in light of either the newly discovered evidence or the alleged Brady violation, and that Dickens did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we affirm.NFP civil opinions today (0):
NFP criminal opinions today (1):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on October 24, 2013 11:00 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions