Thursday, November 21, 2013
Ind. Decisions - SCOIND decides one today
In Danielle Kelly v. State of Indiana, a 14-page, 5-0 opinion, Justice Massa writes:
Danielle Kelly here appeals the denial of her motion to suppress evidence found in a search of her vehicle and inculpatory statements she made to police. We reverse. * * *
At Kelly’s request, the trial court certified that order for interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction. Kelly v. State, 2012 WL 3755693 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012) at *2. In an unpublished opinion, the panel affirmed the trial court’s order. Id. at *8. Kelly sought rehearing, and the panel granted her request, but affirmed its original opinion in all respects, writing only to confirm that it weighed Chief Kiphart’s references to Kelly’s pre-warning admission during post-warning questioning but found they did not amount to coercion. Kelly v. State, 2013 WL 210275 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013) at *2. * * *
[The Warrantless Seizure of Kelly’s Person and Search of Her Vehicle Violated Her Constitutional Rights.] All of these circumstances, in the aggregate, likely would have been enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, but that question is not before us today. What we can say is, on these facts, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Kelly or to search her vehicle. And as we have found her federal constitutional claim dispositive of this issue, we do not address her separate claim that the search and seizure violated rights guaranteed to her by article 1, § 11 of our Indiana Constitution.
[Siebert Prohibits the Admission of Kelly’s Statements to Chief Kiphart.] Kelly argues her statements to Chief Kiphart were obtained involuntarily and should have been suppressed under the rule articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004) (plurality opinion). The State concedes the statements Kelly made before Chief Kiphart read her the Miranda warning should be suppressed, but it contends that her post-Miranda statements are admissible under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) and that Seibert is inapposite here. * * *
These circumstances lead us to conclude, as the Seibert Court did, “that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would not have understood [the Miranda warning] to convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk.” * * *
This does not mean that officers must offer a Miranda warning prior to initiating any conversation with a suspect, nor does it mean that a pre-warning confession necessarily renders a post-warning confession involuntary. Officers may still, under Elstad, cure a good-faith mistake by administering a proper warning before proceeding with further questioning. All we hold today is that such a cure was impossible when it was followed by explicit references to a pre-warning incriminating statement. Finally, as we have found Kelly’s post-warning statements inadmissible under the federal Fifth Amendment, we need not address Kelly’s claim that they are also inadmissible under article 1, § 14 of our own Indiana Constitution.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on November 21, 2013 04:46 PM
Posted to Ind. Sup.Ct. Decisions