« Ind. Gov't. - Worth rereading, quotes from Nov. 19, 2013 NWI Times story | Main | Ind. Decisions - 7th Circuit case from Illinois" "Prosecutor Can Be Sued For Abusive Investigation and Misconduct" »
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 today (and 20 NFP)
For publication opinions today (2):
In Ralph Andrews v. MOR/Ryde International, Inc., a 9-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Pyle writes:
In this interlocutory appeal, Ralph Andrews (“Andrews”) appeals the trial court’s order finding that should his complaint against Mor/Ryde for breach of contract be successful at a future trial, the damages awarded under Indiana Code § 24-4-7-5(b), the Indiana Sales Representative Act (“the Act”), are punitive in nature, and, therefore, would be subject to the evidentiary standard, limitation, and diversion provisions of Indiana’s punitive damages statute under Indiana Code § 34-51-3-1 et seq. We affirm. * * *In Cory L. Meadows v. State of Indiana, a 9-page opinion, Sr. Judge Sharpnack writes:
Hence, we also presume that if the legislature intended the damages awarded under the Act to be something other than punitive in nature, it could have specifically exempted those damages from the requirements of I.C. § 35-51-3-1 et. seq. Therefore, when a plaintiff has alleged bad faith under the Act, the plaintiff must show bad faith by clear and convincing evidence, and any exemplary damages awarded are subject to the requirements of I.C. § 35-51-3-1 et. seq. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CRONE, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., dissents with opinion. [that begins, at p. 7] I respectfully dissent. I do not believe the general statutes and principles governing “punitive” damages control an express statutory award of “exemplary” damages under the Indiana Sales Representative Act, even if those two words are sometimes used interchangeably.
Cory L. Meadows appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for credit time. Meadows presents the case in terms of whether electronic monitoring is restrictive enough to require a grant of credit time. Rather, the case is in terms of whether it is an abuse of discretion to deny credit to a person who fails to comply with conditions for participation in a drug court program under a deferral of conviction and sentence plea agreement. We affirm. * * *NFP civil opinions today (6):
In sum, after careful evaluation of the statutory provisions governing sentencing, electronic monitoring, and deferral programs and after considering the objectives of the deferral programs, we conclude that it was within the trial court’s discretion to deny Meadows credit toward his sentence for time he spent on electronic monitoring while participating in a deferral program.
NFP criminal opinions today (14):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on January 29, 2014 11:31 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions