Monday, March 24, 2014
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 today (and 2 NFP)
For publication opinions today (2):
In Purdue University v. Michael A. Wartell , an 18-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:
Here, Purdue represented to Wartell that it would appoint an independent investigator to investigate his complaint, but then concealed from Wartell that it hired an attorney it intended to serve as its legal counsel; thus, Wartell never had an opportunity to object to the attorney’s appointment on that basis. Relying on Purdue’s representation, Wartell allowed the attorney to interview him, the president, and others and submit an investigative report with determinations and recommendations regarding his complaint to a panel of Purdue’s trustees. Based on these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred in ruling that Purdue should be equitably estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as to Wartell. Therefore, we affirm.ILB: For background, see this Dec. 18, 2013 ILB post.
In David Sesay v. State of Indiana, a 19-page opinion with a concurring opinion, Judge Robb writes:
Following a bench trial, David Sesay was found guilty of public intoxication, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to a term of 180 days, with 178 days suspended to probation. Sesay appeals his conviction, raising a single issue for the court’s review: whether the evidence of “endangerment” is sufficient to support his conviction for public intoxication. Concluding the State failed to prove Sesay engaged in any conduct beyond intoxication that endangered his life, we reverse. * * *NFP civil opinions today (3):
To prove the offense of public intoxication, the State is required to show that a person is in a public place, in an intoxicated state, and—as relevant to this case—endangering his life. Although there is no question that Sesay was in a public place and that he was intoxicated, the State failed to prove that he engaged in any additional conduct that endangered his life. Sesay’s conviction is, therefore, reversed.
RILEY, J., concurs.
BRADFORD, J., concurs in result with separate opinion. [which begins, at p. 16] I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Sesay’s conviction should be reversed. However, I write separately to clarify that while I believe that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show that Sesay was endangered at the time of his arrest, I believe that Indiana Code section 7.1-5-1-3 requires a showing that the endangerment resulted from an affirmative act by Sesay and, in the instant matter, the evidence presented below was insufficient to make such a showing.
NFP criminal opinions today (0):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 24, 2014 11:45 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions