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Wednesday, July 09, 2014

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 5 today (and 8 NFP)

For publication opinions today (5):

In John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his official capacity of Chief of Police, and the Indianapolis Police Department, a 22-page opinion, Judge Pyle writes:

John Lane-El, pro se, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Indianapolis Police Department and Michael Spears in his official capacity as Chief of Police, as well as the trial court’s denial of his motion for in camera review. We affirm in part and reverse in part. * * *

[In 2006 Lae-El filed a public records request with the IPD, requesting 13 specific items or categories of items. ]

The IPD did not respond to Lane-El’s request, and on May 1, 2006, he sent an additional request. Again, the IPD did not respond. On May 31, 2006, Lane-El filed a formal complaint with the State of Indiana’s Public Access Counselor, Karen Davis (“Davis”). Davis sent a letter to the IPD requesting its response to the complaint by June 21, 2006. On July 5, 2006, after not hearing from the IPD, Davis found that the IPD had violated the APRA by failing to respond to Lane-El. * * *

[The opinion continues on...]

In David J. Markey v. Estate of Frances S. Markey, Deceased; Stephen L. Routson, Personal Representative under the Last Will and Testament of Frances S. Markey, Deceased; Stephen L. Routson, et al., a 13-page opinion, Judge Baker writes:
In this case we are asked to clarify the time limit within which an action for a breach of contract to make a will must be filed. Here, appellant-plaintiff David Markey appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee-defendant the Estate of Frances Markey regarding his claim that Frances had violated a contract with Markey’s Father to make mutual wills. Markey argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because he timely filed his action within nine months of Frances’s death. Markey also contends that applying the three-month limitation period for will contest actions would violate his due process rights and maintains that the trial court improperly determined a disputed issue of fact. Conversely, the Estate argues that Markey’s action to enforce a contract to make a will is not a “claim” as defined in Indiana Code section 29-1-14-1 of the Probate Code and that his action is governed by a three-month time limitation. We find that a three-month period of limitation applies to Markey’s action and that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Salvino Verta, et al. v. Salvino Pucci, a 9-page opinion, Judge Pyle concludes:
Because the CCS does not contain any notation to indicate that the clerk had served the April 2013 Scheduling Order or the January 2013 Order on Verta, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Verta’s motion seeking relief from the June 2013 Order. * * * Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Verta’s motion to correct error and remand to the trial court for a hearing to further determine what, if any, monetary damages should be awarded given the CCS’s lack of an entry to indicate that the clerk had sent notice to Verta of the January 2013 Order.
In William M. Belcher v. Catherine Kroczek, D.D.S., an 8-page opinion, Chief Judge Vaidik writes:
Indiana Trial Rule 75(A) allows a case to be filed in any county in Indiana. In this case, Catherine Kroczek, a Lake County dentist, filed suit against William W. Belcher in Lake County under Trial Rule 75(A)(2). Belcher later filed a motion to transfer venue, and a dispute arose over whether Dr. Kroczek had properly established preferred venue in Lake County.

We conclude that preferred venue does not lie in Lake County. In relevant part, Trial Rule 75(A)(2) provides that preferred venue may lie in the county where the chattels at issue are located. When identifying chattels, our Courts have emphasized their transferrable nature. At issue here is Dr. Kroczek’s reputation, privacy, and identity, none of which may be transferred. We therefore conclude that they are not chattels, and Dr. Kroczek may not invoke Trial Rule 75(A)(2). We reverse.

In George Moss v. State of Indiana , a 14-page opinion, Chief Judge Vaidik writes:
In April 2013 George Moss and accomplice Todd Ruffin forced their way into Philip Potenza and Randall Peterman’s home. The men robbed the roommates at gunpoint and shot Peterman in the leg. Moss was convicted of burglary, two counts of robbery, criminal confinement, and carrying a handgun without a license. The trial court sentenced Moss to an aggregate term of forty years. Moss now appeals arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to reopen the case to admit a transcript of a statement Moss intended to use to prove his duress defense. He also seeks review of his forty-year sentence. We find that the trial court did not err in refusing to reopen the case and that his sentence is not inappropriate. We therefore affirm the trial court.
NFP civil opinions today (3):

Marion County Health Department v. Edward Hill (NFP)

Louis Timothy Whyde v. Black Diamond Construction, LLC (NFP)

Keith R. Chaney v. Laura C. Chaney (NFP)

NFP criminal opinions today (5):

Darwin Wilson v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Jerry D. White v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Richard Burrington v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Derrek T. Berryhill v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Victor Glenn v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 9, 2014 11:27 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions