Friday, July 11, 2014
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 4 today (and 4 NFP)
For publication opinions today (4):
In A.H. v. C.E.G., on behalf of G.S., a 12-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:
C.E.G. employed A.H. and G.S. C.E.G. petitioned for an injunction against A.H. on behalf of G.S. pursuant to the Workforce Violence Restraining Orders Act (“WVROA”), which the trial court granted. A.H. appeals, arguing that because this case involves or grows out of a labor dispute, it is governed by the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”), and therefore the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the injunction pursuant to the WVROA. We agree. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss C.E.G.’s petition without prejudice.In In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Z.C., Minor Child, S.C., Mother v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, a 10-page opinion, Judge May writes:
 A.H. filed a verified request to prohibit public access to all filings in this appeal, which our motions panel granted. Therefore, we have used initials for all parties to protect their privacy.
ILB: Neither the opinion or the docket identifies whether this prohibition of public access to all filings was accomplished by the COA under the authority of Adm.Rule 9, and if so, what portion applied, whether a public hearing was required, etc.
S.C. (“Mother”) appeals a termination of her parental rights to her son, Z.C. (“Child”). She asserts the trial court proceedings denied her due process and the evidence is insufficient to support termination of her rights. * * *In Drakkar R. Willis v. State of Indiana , a 9-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Crone writes:
Mother’s arguments are an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge credibility of witnesses). DCS presented sufficient evidence that the conditions under which Child was removed from Mother’s care would not be remedied and that termination was in Child’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm.
Drakkar R. Willis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. We affirm. * * *In Scott A. Wright v. State of Indiana , a 13-page opinion, Judge May writes:
BAKER, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., dissents with opinion. [which begins, at p. 9] I respectfully dissent. I am familiar with and have read the decision in Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255 (Ind. 2014). I do not believe that case demands or commands that the basic and longstanding tenets of the definition of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” be altered. Others may disagree. * * *
We are not in the business of horseshoes and hand grenades, where “close” is good enough. I am convinced the State has failed in its burden of proof and vote to reverse.
Scott A. Wright was found guilty of Class A felony child molesting after the trial court, during jury deliberations, replaced the sole juror who would have voted to find Wright not guilty. Replacement of the juror was error under the facts before us, and the jury was not properly instructed that removal did not reflect approval or disapproval of the juror’s views. We accordingly vacate Wright’s conviction and remand for a new trial. * * *NFP civil opinions today (2):
As Juror 356 voted to acquit Wright based on his belief the victim was not credible, he should not have been replaced for refusal to deliberate. Even if dismissal had been permissible, the newly-constituted jury should have been instructed that the removal of Juror 356 did not reflect the court’s approval or disapproval of the views the juror expressed. We vacate Wright’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
NFP criminal opinions today (2):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 11, 2014 11:00 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions