Thursday, March 19, 2015
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 4 opinion(s) today (and 9 NFP memorandum decisions)
For publication opinions today (4):
In Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission v. Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc. , a 28-page opinion, Judge Bradford writes:
Title 7.1 of the Indiana Code sets forth statutory restrictions relating to the sale of alcoholic beverages within the State of Indiana. Title 7.1 differentiates between the available permits for the sale of liquor, beer, and wine. With respect to the sale of wine, Title 7.1 further differentiates between various types of available permits. The General Assembly has crafted different rules and regulations for each of the available permits. These rules and regulations allow the permit holder to complete certain actions and restrict the permit holder from completing certain actions. The General Assembly has stated that the classifications and differentiations made in Title 7.1 are real and are substantially related to the accomplishment of the purposes of this title. As such, one can reasonably presume that the level of care undertaken by the General Assembly in differentiating between the rules and regulations that apply to the different types of permits indicates that the General Assembly intended for the rules and regulations relating to each individual type of permit to be read alone, and not for any differences between the rules and regulations relating to the different types of permits to be harmonized with each other upon review.In Parviz Jahangirizadeh v. Fatemeh Pazouki, a 12-page opinion, Judge Barnes writes:
In the instant matter, Appellant-Respondent the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission (the “ATC”) determined that Appellee-Petitioner Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc. (“Lebamoff”), which holds a liquor dealer’s permit, had violated the applicable rules and regulations relating to the home delivery of wine. Lebamoff sought judicial review of the ATC’s interpretation in the trial court which, upon review, held in favor of Lebamoff. The ATC appealed. Concluding that the ATC’s interpretation of the applicable rules and regulations was reasonable and did not amount to an improper exercise of the ATC’s rulemaking function, we reinstate and affirm the ATC’s final order. * * *
Applying only the provisions relating to a liquor dealer’s permit, we conclude that the ATC’s interpretation of the relevant statutory authority was reasonable. We further conclude that the ATC’s order did not reflect an improper attempt to create an agency rule, but rather was a proper exercise of the ATC’s adjudicatory function. As such, we reinstate and affirm the ATC’s final order.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with instructions.
Parviz Jahangirizadeh appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to set aside the final decree dissolving his marriage to Fatemeh Pazouki. We affirm.In Johnny Gomillia v. State of Indiana , a 5-page opinion, Judge Barnes writes:
The restated issue before us is whether the trial court properly refused to set aside the parties’ dissolution decree based upon an allegation that Pazouki had failed to disclose marital assets prior to the decree’s entry. * * *
The trial court properly refused to set aside the parties’ dissolution decree, and it was not required to give Jahangirizadeh an opportunity to amend his motion to set aside. We affirm.
Here, there is no evidence that Gomillia knew the statements were false. In fact, Detective Woods testified it is a commonly held belief that the absence of a witness means the dismissal of a case. See Tr. p. 76. Without any evidence suggesting Gomillia knew the statements were false, there is insufficient evidence to establish that he knowingly or intentionally attempted to induce Gaines not to testify by false statement.In Cody Rutledge v. State of Indiana, a 20-page opinion, Judge Brown writes:
Conclusion. Because the State did not establish that Gomillia knew the statements were false when he made them, the State failed to prove the attempted obstruction of justice charge. We reverse.
Cody Rutledge appeals his convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class D felony and driving while suspended as a class A misdemeanor and his status as an habitual substance offender. Rutledge raises two issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence. We affirm. * * *NFP civil decisions today (2):
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Rutledge’s objections, based upon the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, to the admission of evidence obtained after the encounter with Deputy Hurst.
NFP criminal decisions today (7):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on March 19, 2015 10:38 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions