Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 5 opinion(s) today (and 9 NFP memorandum decisions)
For publication opinions today (4):
In Mary Ellen Stump v. St. Joseph County Treasurer, St. Joseph County Auditor, Cavallino Financial, LLC, Donald Wertheimer, James H. Shallenbarger, Jr., and Phillip Miller, a 14-page opinion, Judge Riley writes:
Stump raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:In James E. and Tamara L. Dunmoyer, Jr., Linus and Karen Harrold, Theron and Clara Miller, et al. v. Wells County, Indiana Area Plan Commission, Wells County Wind II, LLC, et al., a 26-page opinion, Judge Kirsch writes:
(1) Whether Stump’s claim for the tax sale surplus was timely made pursuant to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-24-7;
(2) Whether Stump’s lien on the tax sale surplus takes priority over the other claims; and
(3) Whether Stump is entitled to Shallenbarger’s interest in the tax sale surplus based on the joint tenancy in the real estate. * * *
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Stump’s claim for the tax sale surplus was timely made pursuant to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-24-7; and that Stump’s judgment lien takes priority. However, we remand to the trial court to determine the extent, if any, of Shallenbarger’s interest in the tax sale surplus.
The Wells County, Indiana Area Plan Commission (“Plan Commission”) approved a petition for the development of a large wind energy conversion system (“WECS”) project that was filed by Wells County Wind II, LLC, Apex Clean Energy Holdings, LLC, and Apex Wind Energy, Inc. (collectively, “Apex”), thereby allowing the construction of approximately sixty-eight wind turbines on private property located in southern Wells County, Indiana (“Zoning Decision”). Adjacent landowners, James E. and Tamara L. Dunmoyer, Jr.; Linus and Karen Harrold; Theron and Clara Miller; Clarence and Beverly Zimmerman, individually and as Trustees of the Clarence Zimmerman and Beverly Zimmerman Revocable Living Trust; Michael and Barbara Butche; and Jeffrey and Janet Harshman (collectively, “Landowners”), filed with the trial court a two-count petition. In Count I, Landowners requested judicial review of the Zoning Decision, and in Count II they sought declaratory judgment. Landowners now appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Apex and the Plan Commission as to Count I. Landowners raise four issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Plan Commission and Apex upon a finding that Landowners were not aggrieved and not prejudiced by the Zoning Decision.In Christa Allen v. State of Indiana, Indiana Department of Correction, a 6-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:
We affirm and remand with instructions.
Christa Allen appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings after she filed a complaint for personal injury damages against the State of Indiana and the Indiana Department of Correction (collectively “the DOC”). The sole restated issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred when it granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the DOC. Finding no error, we affirm. * * *In James Satterfield v. State of Indiana, a 16-page opinion, Judge Riley writes:
In sum, the JAS is inapplicable, and it is clear from the face of Allen’s complaint that her claim is time-barred and that under no circumstances could relief be granted. The trial court properly dismissed the action pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(C). Consequently, we affirm.
Appellant-Defendant, James Satterfield (Satterfield), appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to let bail following his arrest and charge for murder. * * *[ILB Note: The above opinion replaces the initial April 16th COA opinion, which was withdrawn without comment shortly after it was posted online (but not before the ILB had summarized it).]
Based on the foregoing, we hold that even though Satterfield forfeited his right to appeal due to his failure to timely file a notice of appeal, extraordinarily compelling reasons warrant a review of Satterfield’s argument on the merits. Upon review of the evidence, we reverse the trial court’s denial of bail and remand for a new bail hearing with instructions to weigh Satterfield’s evidence of self-defense. Reversed and remanded.
May, J. concurs
Bradford, J. concurs in result
In Floyd Carr v. State of Indiana, a 4-page opinion with a pro se appellant, Judge May writes:
Floyd Carr appeals the court’s denial of his motion to modify sentence. The court did not abuse its discretion as it had no authority to modify Carr’s sentence without approval of the prosecutor. * * *NFP civil decisions today (2):
However, contrary to Carr’s assertion, the sentence modification statute that became effective in 2014 does not apply to him. * * *
Because the new version of the sentence modification statute does not apply to Carr, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Carr’s motion to modify. Accordingly, we affirm.
NFP criminal decisions today (7):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on May 12, 2015 11:21 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions