« Ind. Courts - Supreme Court posts additional e-filing amendments | Main | Ind. Decisions - Why is this decision today categorized as NFP? »

Friday, July 24, 2015

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 1 opinion(s) today (and 10 NFP memorandum decisions)

For publication opinions today (1):

In Antyon Buford v. State of Indiana , an 11-page opinion, Judge May writes:

Antyon Buford appeals his convictions of Class A felony dealing cocaine, Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance. As the warrant on which the search of his residence was premised was not supported by probable cause, we reverse and remand. * * *

Buford argues the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant should have been suppressed because the affidavit the police offered in obtaining the warrant included uncorroborated hearsay and false or misleading statements. As the probable cause affidavit included hearsay information that was not corroborated by the totality of the circumstances, the warrant should not have been issued. * * *

In the case before us, the totality of the circumstances did not corroborate a hearsay statement that there was “dealing” of drugs from Buford’s residence or that “a search at that address would yield fruits of the crime” of dealing. Id. We must accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.

NFP civil decisions today (6):

In the Matter of the Adoption of: A.E.G.; A.G. v. E.R.J., and K.M.J. (mem. dec.)

In Charles Bradley Nixon v. JNJ Foods, LLC d/b/a McDonald's (mem. dec.), a 12-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Baker writes:

Charles Bradley Nixon appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of JNJ Foods, LLC d/b/a McDonald’s (JNJ) on Nixon’s complaint for damages for injuries suffered after biting into food that allegedly contained a foreign object. Finding that there are genuine issues of material fact rendering summary judgment improper, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In In Re the Marriage of: David P. Allen v. Kimberly W. Allen (mem. dec.), an 8-page opinion, Judge Bailey writes:
David P. Allen (“Father”) appeals an order that he pay 100% of dental school tuition for Hunter Allen (“Hunter”), his youngest child with Kimberly W. Allen (“Mother”). * * * We reverse and remand for a college expenses order appropriately apportioning the costs between Hunter, her father, and her mother.
In Re the Marriage of John Lane v. Leisa Lane (mem. dec.)

Diane Lane, Darrell Lane v. Danny English (mem. dec.) -THIS LINK is wrong.

In Kenneth Eugene Million v. Sheriff of Johnson County, Indiana; Indiana Department of Correction; Indiana State Police; and State of Indiana (mem. dec.), a 7-page opinion, Judge May writes:

Keith Eugene Million appeals the denial of his request to be released from the requirement that he register as a sex offender in Indiana. We reverse. * * *

“Substantially Similar” Clause

Million argues he should not have to register under the “substantially similar” clause because the facts in his case are like those in Wallace v. State * * *

Million committed his crime in 1989, before Indiana enacted INSORA in 1994. Therefore, like in Burton and Hough, the imposition of a requirement that he register as a sex offender in Indiana violates our constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

Required to Register in Another Jurisdiction

Under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f), an Indiana resident who is “required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction” is required to register as a sex offender in Indiana for the time required by the other jurisdiction or the time required by INSORA, “whichever is longer.” Id. Million was not required to register as a sex offender in Florida. Therefore, he is not required to register as a sex offender in Indiana under Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f). See Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (Andrews, who was convicted of multiple sex offenses in Massachusetts in 1984, was not required to register as a sex offender after moving to Indiana because he was not required to register as a sex offender under Massachusetts law).[5]
______
[5] The State relies on our recent holding in Tyson v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied, however, Tyson is easily distinguishable. Tyson committed a sexual offense in Texas in 2002. Under Texas law, Tyson was required to register as a sex offender until 2014. When Tyson moved to Indiana in 2009, he did not register as a sex offender and was charged with Class D felony failure to register. Tyson moved to dismiss, and we affirmed based on the plain language of Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f). As Million had no requirement to register in Florida, Tyson is inapposite.

NFP criminal decisions today (4):

Anthony Levell Gregory, II v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Walter L. Robertson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Manuel Guzman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Marcus Stidhum v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 24, 2015 12:15 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions