Friday, January 29, 2016
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 5 opinion(s) today (and 38 NFP memorandum decision(s))
For publication opinions today (5):
In Carrie A. Greer v. Discover Bank , a 5-page opinion with a pro se appellant, Judge Najam writes:
Carrie A. Greer appeals the trial court’s entry of default judgment against her and in favor of Discover Bank (“Discover”). Greer raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Greer had been adequately served with a summons and Discover’s complaint against her. However, because Greer did not follow the proper procedure for perfecting her appeal of this issue, we are obliged to dismiss the appeal. * * *In Jason Hansbrough v. State of Indiana , a 9-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:
Greer did not file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from the trial court’s entry of default judgment against her. Accordingly, her appeal is not properly before us. Siebert Oxidermo, 446 N.E.2d at 337.
Jason Hansbrough appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a level 4 felony. During a valid traffic stop of Hansbrough’s vehicle, police officers conducted a dog sniff around the vehicle. After the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics, officers searched the vehicle and found a firearm. Hansbrough unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search arguing that the dog sniff prolonged the traffic stop in violation of his constitutional rights. The evidence was subsequently admitted at trial over his continuing objection. The sole restated issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the search. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.In Ronald L. Sanford, Jr. v. State of Indiana , an 11-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:
Ronald L. Sanford, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal of his sentence filed pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to carry his burden to prove that he was diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal. He also argues that pursuant to In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965 (Ind. 2014), his right to appeal should be restored due to extraordinarily compelling reasons.In Willie Moore v. State of Indiana , a 28-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Pyle writes:
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanford’s petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal. We also conclude that O.R. need not be extended to criminal defendants who already have a remedy for reinstating an untimely appeal through Post-Conviction Rule 2. Therefore, we affirm.
We conclude that: (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Moore, so the stop was lawful under the United States Constitution; (2) the officer’s actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, so the stop was lawful under the Indiana Constitution; and (3) the Illinois statute for residential burglary was substantially similar to the Indiana statute for burglary. However, we agree with Moore that there was not sufficient evidence to elevate his resisting law enforcement conviction to a Level 6 felony because there was no evidence that he proximately caused the officer’s injuries. As a result, we affirm Moore’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, but we reverse his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. We remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate Moore’s resisting law enforcement conviction and to enter a new conviction and sentence for the lesser-included offense of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. * * *In Kimberly Y. Morgan v. State of Indiana, a 6-page opinion, Judge Bailey writes:
Baker, J., concurs.
Bradford, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion. [which begins, at p. 26] I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the handgun discovered on Moore’s person into evidence. I also concur with the majority’s conclusion that the Illinois statute for residential burglary was substantially similar to the Indiana burglary statute. However, because I believe that the evidence was such that the trial court, acting as the trier-of-fact, could reasonably conclude that Moore’s actions were the proximate cause of Officer Helmer’s injury, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Moore’s conviction for Level 6 felony resisting arrest.
Kimberly Y. Morgan (“Morgan”) appeals a restitution order following her pleas of guilty to three counts of Theft, as Class D felonies. She presents the issue of whether the trial court properly ordered her to pay $16,000.00 to the Howard County Convention and Visitors Commission, Inc. (“the Visitors Commission”), in addition to the $11,455.48 agreed-upon restitution to Selective Insurance Company of America (“Selective Insurance”). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.NFP civil decisions today (15):
NFP criminal decisions today (23):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on January 29, 2016 11:39 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions