Tuesday, February 09, 2016
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 opinion(s) today (and 7 NFP memorandum decision(s))
For publication opinions today (2):
In Robert Samuels and Simon Lynes v. Berney W. Garlick, Laurie A. Garlick, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Saxon Asset-Securities Trust 2007-4, and Ind. Dept. of Revenue, a 13-page opinion, Judge Crone concludes:
Here, S&L assert that the Saxon mortgage “both over- and under-describes the Mortgaged Property” and therefore “it is impossible to determine which property was intended to be mortgaged.” Appellants’ Br. at 9. We disagree. The Saxon mortgage, which is in the Garlicks’ chain of title, put prospective purchasers or mortgagees on notice of an existing mortgage on property commonly known as 8611 West 96th Street, Zionsville – the same address shown on Lot 1 of the Copper Ridge Secondary Plat, which is also in the Garlicks’ chain of title. The Saxon mortgage’s metes and bounds description is a facially valid legal description, has the same geographic starting point as that of the Copper Ridge Secondary Plat, and encompasses the western 155 feet ofIn Nicole Miller v. State of Indiana, an 8-page opinion, Judge Baker writes:
that plat. As we said under analogous circumstances in Lawrence, the fact that the premises described in the Saxon mortgage encompasses more (and/or less) real estate than was owned by the Garlicks “is relevant only to the issue whether there is a valid and enforceable lien on the non-owned premises; it does not impair the validity of the lien on the mortgaged premises.” 565 N.E.2d at 359.
Consequently, we agree with the trial court that Deutsche Bank has a prior and therefore superior lien as to that part of Lot 1 in Copper Ridge Secondary Plat that is covered by the legal description in the Saxon mortgage. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of partial summary judgment in Deutsche Bank’s favor.
Nicole Miller appeals the trial court’s interlocutory order denying her motion to suppress evidence. A police officer, responding to a call of a “disturbance” but lacking probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity, asked Miller to speak with him. When she instead walked away, she was arrested for resisting law enforcement. Reasserting the principles of Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014), we find that this arrest violated Miller’s well-established right to walk away; consequently, the subsequent search incident to the arrest violated her Fourth Amendment rights. We reverse and remand. [ILB emphasis]
NFP civil decisions today (2):
NFP criminal decisions today (5):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on February 9, 2016 11:37 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions