Tuesday, May 24, 2016
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 opinion(s) today (and 19 NFP memorandum decision(s))
For publication opinions today (2):
In Kaitlyn Schneider v. Paragon Realty, LLC , a 12-page opinion, Judge Najam writes:
Kaitlyn Schneider appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Paragon Realty, LLC (“Paragon”) on Schneider’s complaint alleging that, as a result of the negligence of Paragon and other defendants, Schneider sustained personal injuries. Schneider presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of Paragon. * * *In Tresa Megenity v. David Dunn , a 16-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Najam writes:
Considering the designated evidence on summary judgment, none of Schneider’s contentions support a claim against Paragon. As Heartland’s property manager, Paragon was responsible for physical maintenance and administrative duties, such as collecting rents. While Schneider was Paragon’s invitee with respect to the physical integrity of the common areas outside of Bubbaz, there was no contractual or other relationship between the parties with respect to the allegations against Paragon set out in her complaint. Neither as a matter of law nor as a matter of fact did Paragon exercise control over, or have any responsibility for, the manner in which Heartland’s tenants conducted their businesses. The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Paragon. Affirmed.
Tresa Megenity appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of David Dunn on Megenity’s complaint, in which she alleged that Dunn was negligent and reckless and proximately caused her serious bodily injury during a karate practice session. Megenity presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of Dunn. * * *NFP civil decisions today (4):
We hold that the “general nature of the conduct reasonable and appropriate for a participant” in a karate practice drill is not “commonly understood and subject to ascertainment as a matter of law.” See Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 403-04. And Megenity has designated evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact whether Dunn’s kick was a jump kick and, if so, whether such a kick was outside the range of ordinary behavior for a karate student engaged in a kicking-the-bag practice drill. Accordingly, we cannot say that Dunn did not breach his duty of care to Megenity as a matter of law, and the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Dunn. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
May, J., concurs.
Riley, J., dissents with separate opinion. [that begins, at p. 13] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision reversing the trial court’s summary judgment and holding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Dunn’s kick “was outside the range of ordinary behavior for a karate student engaged in a kicking-the-bag practice drill.”
NFP criminal decisions today (15):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on May 24, 2016 11:22 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions