Friday, July 29, 2016
Ind. Decisions - 7th Circuit decides Indiana case re Title VII and sexual orientation discrimination
In Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College (ND Ind., Lozano), a 42-page opinion issed July 28th, Judge Rovner writes:
Once again this court is asked to consider whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from or offers redress for discrimination based on sexual orientation. This time, however, we do so in the shadow of a criticism from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that this court and others have continued to reflexively declare that sexual orientation is not cognizable under Title VII without due analysis or consideration of intervening case law. The EEOC’s criticism has created a groundswell of questions about the rationale for denying sexual orientation claims while allowing nearly indistinguishable gender non‐conformity claims, which courts have long recognized as a form of sex‐based discrimination under Title VII. After a careful analysis of our precedent, however, this court must conclude that Kimberly Hively has failed to state a claim under Title VII for sex discrimination; her claim is solely for sexual orientation discrimination which is beyond the scope of the statute. Consequently, we affirm the decision of the district court. * * *
It may be that the rationale appellate courts, including this one, have used to distinguish between gender non‐conformity discrimination claims and sexual orientation discrimination claims will not hold up under future rigorous analysis. It seems illogical to entertain gender non‐conformity claims under Title VII where the non‐conformity involves style of dress or manner of speaking, but not when the gender non‐conformity involves the sine qua non of gender stereotypes—with whom a person engages in sexual relationships. And we can see no rational reason to entertain sex discrimination claims for those who defy gender norms by looking or acting stereotypically gay or lesbian (even if they are not), but not for those who are openly gay but otherwise comply with gender norms. We allow two women or two men to marry, but allow employers to terminate them for doing so. Perchance, in time, these inconsistencies will come to be seen as defying practical workability and will lead us to reconsider our precedent. Id. See also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (“in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”)
Perhaps the writing is on the wall. It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on who they date, love, or marry. The agency tasked with enforcing Title VII does not condone it; many of the federal courts to consider the matter have stated that they do not condone it; and this court undoubtedly does not condone it. [ILB: cites omitted] But writing on the wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, we must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent, and therefore, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, joins the judgment of the court and joins Parts I and IIA of the panel’s opinion.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 29, 2016 08:45 AM
Posted to Ind. (7th Cir.) Decisions