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Friday, July 15, 2016

Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 2 opinion(s) today (and 13 NFP memorandum decision(s))

For publication opinions today (2):

In South Indiana Propane Gas, Inc. v. John Caffrey and Leola Caffrey , a 12-page opinion, Judge Pyle writes:

Appellant/Defendant, South Indiana Propane Gas, Inc. (“SIPG”) appeals the trial court’s order requiring it to pay a portion of the attorney fees of Appellees/Plaintiffs, John Caffrey (“John”) and Leola Caffrey (“Leola”) (collectively, “the Caffreys”) on their breach of contract claim. The trial court held that the Caffreys could recover their attorney fees because SIPG’s defense to its breach of contract was unreasonable, groundless, or in bad faith. On appeal, SIPG argues that its defense was not unreasonable, groundless, or in bad faith because: (1) the issue of whether it was required to pay attorney fees was worthy of litigation; and (2) it performed under the contract within thirty days of learning of its failure to perform. Because we are not persuaded that SIPG’s defense was not unreasonable, groundless, or in bad faith, we affirm.
In Larenz Jordan v. State of Indiana , a 13-page opinion, Judge Bailey writes:
Jordan raises two issues for our review, which we restate as:
I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted the State’s motion to waive jurisdiction over Jordan’s case; and
II. Whether Jordan’s sentence was inappropriate and requires revision under Appellate Rule 7(B). * * *

Jordan’s specific allegation of error centers on the court’s use of the phrase “criminal thinking” in its findings concerning the “beyond rehabilitation” element of the waiver statute. Jordan contends that for the court to have entered findings concerning “criminal thinking,” as used in the waiver order, the record required evidence related to “criminogenic traits” as those are understood to apply within the context of evidence-based practices in sentencing and rehabilitation. (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Jordan notes that “no data was presented regarding criminogenic traits, testing of said traits, or criminal thinking as an area of relevant inquiry.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) Absent such evidence, Jordan insists, “the juvenile court had no basis to conclude that Jordan’s criminal thinking presented a bar to his successful rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) Thus, Jordan argues that the court’s waiver order was defective as a matter of law. * * *

There is no error associated with the juvenile court’s use of the phrase “criminal thinking” without reference to evidence-based measures of criminogenic behavior where, as here, the elements of the waiver statute are otherwise properly addressed and supported by evidence from the record of the waiver hearing. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion where there was no evidence related to criminal thinking as that term is used in evidence-based practices assessing criminogenic behavior.

NFP civil decisions today (4):

Pinnacle Properties Development Group, LLC v. David Daily (mem. dec.)

In the Matter of Al.G., As.G., and J.D., Jr. (Minor Children), Children in Need of Services, and C.G. (Mother) and J.D. (Father) v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.)

Brian L. Boyland, Jennifer K. Boyland, et al. v. Kenneth Hedge, et al. (mem. dec.)

In State of Indiana v. Monroe Liberty, LLC (mem. dec.), a 9-page opinion, Judge Crone writes:

The State of Indiana brings this interlocutory appeal in an eminent domain action involving the taking of real property owned by Monroe Liberty, LLC, for the extension of I-69 from Evansville to Indianapolis. This action is in the damages phase, which has yet to be tried by the jury. The subject of this appeal is the “Trial Order for June 23, 24, 2015” (“the Order”), denying the State’s motion in limine. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude certain evidence and testimony. Specifically, the State asserts that certain evidence and testimony pertaining to the highest and best use and/or the value of Monroe Liberty’s property is inadmissible because that evidence and testimony are based wholly or partly on the construction and completion of I-69, the project for which the property is being taken.2 Because we conclude that the evidentiary issues raised by the State are not ripe for our review, we dismiss the State’s appeal.
NFP criminal decisions today (9):

Nicholas King v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Tamara Kalinowski Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Brian Firestone v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Keith Hosea v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Ricky D. Wessel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Dolphus Ballinger v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Oliver Furnell Clemmons v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

jesse T. Buchanan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Mark D. Priest v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 15, 2016 03:53 PM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions