Wednesday, July 27, 2016
Ind. Decisions - Court of Appeals issues 3 opinion(s) today (and 5 NFP memorandum decision(s))
For publication opinions today (3):
In Kevin R. Koontz v. Erin L. (Koontz) Scott , a 10-page opinion, Judge Altice writes:
Kevin R. Koontz (Father) appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay one-third of the costs associated with his son’s college expenses. Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Brant Scott-Koontz (Son) had not repudiated his relationship with Father. * * *In Lisa R. Harris v. State of Indiana, a 22-page, 2-1 opinion, Judge Robb writes:
Much of Father’s argument on appeal amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Lovold, 988 N.E.2d at 1151. This is not a case of a father standing with open arms and suffering “the deeply painful rejection” of his child. McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 167 (quoting Milne, 556 A.2d at 865). Based on our review of the evidence and testimony most favorable to the judgment, we cannot say that we are left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made or that the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that Son has not repudiated his relationship with Father. Lechien, 950 N.E.2d at 844. Judgment affirmed.
Lisa Harris appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained from a consent search during a seat belt enforcement stop. Concluding the officer lacked an independent basis of reasonable suspicion justifying inquiry above and beyond the seat belt violation, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. * * *In Danny Cherry v. State of Indiana , a 21-page opinion, Judge Brown writes:
Trooper Organ lacked an independent basis of reasonable suspicion that would justify further inquiry during a seat belt enforcement stop. Because his questioning violated the Act, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Harris’s motion to suppress, and we remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., concurs.
Najam, J., dissents with opinion. [that begins on p. 14, and concludes] Nothing about the circumstances of Trooper Organ’s investigation demonstrates that he used the seatbelt violation merely to go on a fishing expedition. To the contrary, Trooper Organ’s investigation was simply good police work. The Seatbelt Enforcement Act does not require an officer who stops a motorist to quarantine and disregard the officer’s actual knowledge of the motorist’s identity and previous conduct. And where, as here, that actual knowledge is coupled with evasive and furtive behavior, the officer may connect the dots. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Harris’ motion to suppress.
[Issues] I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Cherry’s recorded interview with police as well as documents produced by various internet and cellular providers;NFP civil decisions today (1):
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Cherry’s convictions. * * *
The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Cherry’s recorded interview with police and documents produced by various internet and cellular providers. * * *
Detective Schafer obtained multiple warrants for different companies including Facebook and the service provider for the cell phone used to access Facebook. As a result of the responses to the search warrants, he determined that a Samsung Illusion model I or I110 cell phone with a specific MEID number and IP address was used to access certain Facebook pages, that the phone was purchased at a Wal-Mart store in Huntsville, Alabama, that the phone number related to the phone had been changed multiple times, and that there were several phone numbers with a 317 area code that had been called repeatedly. He determined that the IP address was physically located at 5025 Blue Spring Road in Huntsville, Alabama, and was ultimately able to narrow down a specific apartment there. He passed this information to Detectives Fogarty and Edward Brickley. * * *
Cherry cites Ind. Evidence Rule 901 and argues that there was no evidence to link the photographs or text messages that supported the State’s argument on the counts of intimidation, child exploitation, intimidation, stalking, and dissemination of matter harmful to minors other than the documents that used the MEID. Without citation to the record, he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his timely objection to the authenticity of the documents. He does not cite to any specific exhibit out of the seventy-nine exhibits that were admitted at trial to support his argument that the trial court abused its discretion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (governing the arrangement and content of briefs and providing that “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22” and that “[i]f the admissibility of evidence is in dispute, citation shall be made to the pages of the Transcript where the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected, in conformity with Rule 22(C)”). Accordingly, we conclude that Cherry waived this argument.
NFP criminal decisions today (4):
Posted by Marcia Oddi on July 27, 2016 11:21 AM
Posted to Ind. App.Ct. Decisions