Friday, September 23, 2016
Ind. Decisions - 7th Circuit decided one Indiana case yesterday, re claim of overtime under FLSA
In James Melton v. Tippecanoe County, Indiana (ND Ind., Springmann), an 11-page opinion, Judge Kanne writes:
After he disregarded an order from his supervisor that he could not change his schedule to make up for missed time, Plaintiff James Melton was discharged from his job at the Tippecanoe County Surveyor’s Office. Melton later filed suit against the County, alleging that dur‐ ing his time there, he had arrived early and worked through lunch every day and was not compensated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the County because Melton had not designated sufficient evidence to find that he worked more than forty hours in a workweek. We affirm. * * *
In his complaint, Melton alleged that his timecards did not accurately reflect the hours he worked because when he put his actual time worked on his timecard, the office secre‐ tary would reduce his hours to 37.5, telling him that he could not be paid for more than 37.5 hours in a workweek. Specifi‐ cally, Melton claimed that he was not compensated for (1) time worked before 8 a.m. even though his supervisor told him to come to work early every day and (2) time worked through all or part of his floating lunch each day.
In support of his claim that he was not properly compen‐ sated, and in response to discovery requests, Melton pro‐ duced a spreadsheet created from memory that purports to show the dates and times he worked during the whole of his employment with Tippecanoe County. * * *
As we explained earlier, even if Melton had put forth his evidence supporting his claim of overtime lunch hours, his testimony by spreadsheet is so “internally inconsistent [and] implausible on its face” that it cannot satisfy Melton’s bur‐ den to establish a prima facie FLSA case. Seshadri, 130 F.3d at 802. Melton knew that the County was arguing that his rec‐ ollection and spreadsheet were “unreliable,” and he certain‐ ly had a meaningful opportunity to address that argument. Instead, he deemed it “premature.” It was not, and neither was the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Posted by Marcia Oddi on September 23, 2016 09:34 AM
Posted to Ind. (7th Cir.) Decisions